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PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL TAX OBSTRUCTION CASES: HOW DOJ 
INTERNAL POLICY LIMITED THE CRIME OF CORRUPTLY OBSTRUCTING THE IRS 
UNTIL THE SUPREME COURT STEPPED IN, AND WHY TAX CRIMINALS WILL STILL 
GET CONVICTED 
Kathryn W. Booth* 
Abstract 
 
In Marinello v. United States, the Supreme Court recently held 7-2 that the crime 
of corruptly obstructing the administration of the Internal Revenue laws under 
26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) requires the government to prove that the defendant 
obstructed a known, pending IRS proceeding, or at least a proceeding that was 
“reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant.  The court also held that the 
government must prove that the defendant’s conduct bore a “nexus” to such IRS 
proceeding. Prior to the Supreme Court decision, a majority of circuits—save 
only one—held that no such pending IRS proceeding and no such nexus was 
required.  One of the reasons the Supreme Court articulated in Marinello for 
limiting the statute was that prosecutorial discretion was insufficient to limit the 
statute’s broad scope.   
Indeed, prosecutorial discretion has historically been the primary safeguard 
against the statute’s broad reach. The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has 
historically limited charges under § 7212(a) to conduct that occurs during a 
pending IRS audit or investigation, or to conduct that is large in scale and 
affecting the tax liability of third parties. These policy limitations have largely 
limited prosecutions to cases in which the defendant intended to hinder a specific 
IRS proceeding. What’s more, this DOJ internal policy guidance seems to have 
influenced courts’ decisions not to judicially curtail the statute’s scope.  Because 
most actions authorized by DOJ fit within a narrow reading of § 7212(a), this 
prosecutorial discretion on initiating charges have ensured that prior 
constitutional overbreadth challenges to the statute have necessarily failed. 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court recently imposed apparently drastic new 
limitations on § 7212(a), prosecutions under the statute in the wake of Marinello 
are unlikely to significantly change. DOJ has historically limited the statute’s 
scope anyway, so complying with Marinello will not drastically alter what 
conduct is charged as obstruction. Further, when DOJ has charged conduct that 
occurred in the absence of a pending IRS proceeding, there were typically 
multiple additional crimes for which a defendant could have been convicted, 
such that without the § 7212(a) charge, the defendant’s sentence would not 
materially change.  
 
 
* At the time this article was written, Kathryn W. Booth was an Instructor in Law at Vanderbilt University Law School.  She is no longer affiliated 
with the university.  She would like to express her gratitude to the following individuals for their helpful comments and edits: Carolyn Floyd, Carrie 
Gray, Kirsten Hildebrand, Mason Lowe, Darryl Stewart, and Culwell Ward. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a crime to corruptly obstruct or impede the due administration of 
the Internal Revenue Laws.1  The Supreme Court recently held in 
Marinello v. United States (“Marinello III”) that to convict a defendant of 
obstruction under 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), the government must prove that 
the defendant obstructed a known, pending IRS proceeding and that there 
was a nexus between the defendant’s conduct and the proceeding.2  Until 
Marinello III, a majority of circuit courts held that § 7212(a) reached 
conduct that occurred before, or in the absence of, a pending IRS 
proceeding.3   
Although courts have until recently supported an expansive reading of 
the statute, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has traditionally limited 
the use of § 7212(a) to cases in which the defendant’s conduct interfered 
with a pending IRS proceeding, or at least where the conduct bore indicia 
of intent to interfere with a specific IRS action or agent.4  DOJ has 
traditionally exercised a great deal of prosecutorial restraint in selecting 
when to charge defendants with corrupt obstruction of the Internal 
Revenue Laws under § 7212(a). This restraint, in the form of Tax Division 
policy statements, has generally limited § 7212(a) prosecutions to those 
occurring after an audit has begun or a tax return was filed, except in 
large-scale tax schemes affecting the tax liability of third parties.  As a 
result, nearly every prosecution initiated under § 7212(a)’s omnibus 
clause has been based on conduct that either obstructed a specific IRS 
action or that carried additional indicia of intent to interfere with pending 
IRS actions.   
The DOJ’s atypical treatment seems to have influenced the way courts 
 
 1. See Attempts to Interfere with Administration of Internal Revenue Laws, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) 
(1954). 
 2. Marinello v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101, 1109 (2018).  
 3. See United States v. Westbrooks, 858 F.3d 317, 322-23 (5th Cir. May 24, 2017), reversed and 
remanded, 584 U.S. __ (2018); United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 222 (2d Cir. 2016), rev’d and 
remanded, 584 U.S. __ (2018) (holding that to be convicted of 7212(a), defendant need not have been 
aware of pending IRS action at time he engaged in corrupt conduct); United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 
1217, 1232 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1163 (2016) (same); United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 
22, 32 (1st Cir. 2014)(same); United States v. Wood, 384 F. App’x. 698, 700 (10th Cir. 2010)(same); 
United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2005)(same); but see United States v. Miner, 
774 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2014)(holding § 7212(a) requires the government to prove that, at the time he 
engaged in corrupt conduct, defendant was aware of pending IRS action or proceeding); United States v. 
Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998) (same). 
 4. See Part II(A).  
3
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prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Marinello III declined to limit 
the broad provisions of that statute.  Courts considering the scope of § 
7212(a) were clearly aware that the Tax Division usually curtails the use 
of § 7212(a).  Moreover, DOJ policy has limited the types of cases 
initiated and thus limited the cases available to test the statute’s limits to 
cases where the defendant intended to interfere with, or to initiate, a 
specific IRS proceeding.  As a result, when courts were faced with 
overbreadth or vagueness challenges to § 7212(a), such challenges 
necessarily failed.     
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court in Marinello III recently 
changed the law in most jurisdictions, imposing more stringent 
requirements on charges under § 7212(a), not much is likely to change.  
The same DOJ policy limitations that led courts to decline to limit the 
statute mean that charges under § 7212(a) already loosely complied with 
Marinello III’s new requirements for the statute. Further, DOJ policy 
limiting charges to large-scale conduct affecting the tax liability of third 
parties resulted in defendants being charged with § 7212(a) for conduct 
that was also punishable by other felony tax charges. Finally, the new 
requirements for charging § 7212(a) are not likely to motivate the IRS to 
notify targets that they are under investigation any sooner than it 
otherwise would have done.  
II. ATTEMPTS TO INTERFERE WITH ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNAL 
REVENUE LAWS, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(A): LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, DOJ 
POLICY, THE CIRCUIT SPLIT, AND THE SUPREME COURT’S RECENT 
DECISION IN MARINELLO V. UNITED STATES. 
This section will explain the legislative history surrounding the 
enactment of § 7212(a), the development of DOJ internal guidance about 
what type of conduct constitutes “corrupt obstruction” of the Internal 
Revenue Laws.  This section will also examine the recent circuit split and 
the Supreme Court decision in Marinello III, in which the Court held that 
to be convicted of a violation of § 7212(a), a defendant’s conduct must 
have a nexus to a known, pending IRS proceeding.5  
Title 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) makes it a crime to corruptly, or by force or 
by threats, obstruct or impede the due administration of the Internal 
Revenue laws.6  The provision of § 7212(a) criminalizing obstruction that 
 
 5. See Marinello v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018).  
 6. Title 26, United States Code, Section 7212(a) (1954) provides in relevant part,  
Whoever corruptly or by force or threats of force (including any threatening letter or 
communication) endeavors to intimidate or impede any officer or employee of the United 
States acting in an official capacity under this title, or in any other way corruptly or by force 
or threats of force (including any threatening letter or communication) obstructs or impedes, 
or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title, shall, upon conviction 
4
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is accomplished “corruptly,” rather than by force or by threats, is 
commonly referred to as the “omnibus clause.” 7   
The statute is broken into two parts. The first clause deals with use of 
force or threats of force against an officer or employee of the IRS.8  The 
second clause, the omnibus clause, is a “catch-all” prohibiting “in any 
other way corruptly” obstructing or impeding “the due administration of 
this title.”9  
To prove a violation of the omnibus clause of § 7212(a), the 
government must prove the defendant (1) corruptly (2) endeavored (3) to 
obstruct or impede the administration of the Internal Revenue Code.10  
“Corruptly” means to act with intent to secure an unlawful advantage or 
benefit for oneself or for another person.11  To “endeavor” is to 
“knowingly and intentionally act or to knowingly and intentionally make 
any effort which has a reasonable tendency to bring about the desired 
result.”12 
A. The Legislative History of § 7212(a): The IRS Obstruction Statute 
Was Intended to Criminalize Threatening, Use of Force Against, or 
Corrupt Solicitation of an IRS Employee 
Section 7212(a) was enacted as part of the general Tax Code in 1954.13  
It appears to have evolved from a predecessor statute in the 1939 Tax 
Code, which made it a crime to interfere with IRS assessment or 
collection efforts.14  The 1939 obstruction provision was a sub-section of 
a statute entitled “Entry of Premises for Examination of Taxable Objects,” 
making it a crime to “[f]orcibly obstruct or hinder any collector, deputy 
collector, internal revenue agent, or inspector, in the execution of any 
power and authority vested in him by law.”15  Apparently, prior to 1954, 
the criminal code did not prohibit intimidating an IRS employee by 
threats of force (only by actual force), and § 7212(a) was designed, in 
part, to remedy this and provide greater protection for IRS employees.16  
 
thereof, be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 3 years, or both . . . . 
 7. See United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 11. See United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 12. See United States v. Kelly (“Kelly I”), 147 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 13. See United States v. Walker, 514 F. Supp. 294, 304 (E.D. La. 1981). 
 14. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 34, § 3601(c) (1), 53 Stat. 436 (repealed 1954); Walker, 514 
F. Supp. at 304. 
 15. See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 34, § 3601(c) (1), 53 Stat. 436 (repealed 1954). 
 16. See S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 604 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
4621, 4784 (emphasis added) and in 2 Internal Revenue Acts of the United States, The Act of 1954 with 
5
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Thus, § 7212(a) was broader than the previous iteration because it 
criminalized certain non-forceful, corrupt, obstructive conduct. 
The House and Senate reports from § 7212(a)’s enactment are brief.  
Both reports, however, explained that the new § 7212(a) was intended to 
prohibit the use of force or threats of force against, or corrupt solicitation 
of, an IRS employee engaged in an official capacity.  The House report 
stated: 
 
A provision of the Criminal Code makes it an offense punishable by 
a $5,000 fine or 3 years’ imprisonment or both to forcibly assault, 
resist, oppose, etc., any officer or employee acting under the 
internal-revenue laws.17  A similar, but amplified, provision of this 
bill covers all cases where the officer is intimidated or injured; that 
is, where corruptly, by force or threat of force, directly or by 
communication, an attempt is made to impede the administration of 
the internal-revenue laws.  The penalty in the case of all such 
attempts to interfere with administration of the internal-revenue 
laws is to be a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for 
not more than 5 years or both.18 
 
The Senate report discussing the enactment states:  
 
Subsection (a) of this section, relating to the intimidation or 
impeding of any officer or employee of the United States acting in 
an official capacity under this tide, or by force or threat of force 
attempting to obstruct or impede the due administration of this title 
is new in part.  This section provides for the punishment of threats 
or threatening acts against agents of the Internal Revenue Service, 
or any other officer or employee of the United States, or members of 
the families of such persons, on account of the performance by such 
agents or officers or employees of their official duties.  This section 
will also punish the corrupt solicitation of an internal revenue 
employee. Subsection (a) of this section is broader than section 111 
of title 18 of the United States Code, relating to persons assaulting, 
resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees of the United 
States while engaged in the performance of their official duties, in 
that it covers threats of force (including any threatening letter or 
 
Legislative Histories and Documents, 562, 604 (Bernard D. Reams Jr. ed., 1982); Walker, 514 F. Supp. 
at 305. 
 17. This appears to be a reference to 18 U.S.C. § 111, which prohibited assaulting a federal officer 
performing official duties.  See Walker, 514 F. Supp. at 304. [Footnote not included in statutory text.] 
 18. H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at 108 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code & Cong. Admin. News 
4017, 4136 and in 1 Internal Revenue Acts of the United States, The Act of 1954 with Legislative Histories 
and Documents, at 108 (Bernard D. Reams Jr., ed., 1982) (emphasis added). 
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communication) or corrupt solicitation. 19   
 
Although the legislative history indicates that § 7212(a) was designed 
to deal with use of force, threats of force, or corrupt solicitation of 
identifiable internal revenue agents acting in an official capacity, and 
those agents’ family members, neither the House report nor the Senate 
report gives any hint that the statute was intended to go further.20  The 
legislative history contemplates prosecutions of archetypally obstructive 
conduct—conduct specifically designed to obstruct an ongoing IRS 
concern. 
B. Treading Cautiously: How Tax Division Internal Policy Has Limited 
the Scope of § 7212(a) Prosecutions to Conduct Obstructive of a 
Pending IRS Proceeding or Other Large-Scale Corrupt Obstructive 
Conduct 
The DOJ has historically maintained a conservative approach when 
charging defendants with the omnibus clause.  Although § 7212(a) was 
enacted in 1954, the government did not bring the first charge under the 
omnibus clause until 1981.21  In fact, in at least one previous case, the 
government construed § 7212(a) to apply only to conduct involving force, 
violence, or threats against IRS agents.22  The court that apparently 
interpreted the first use of the omnibus clause noted that the court would 
need to “proceed cautiously where for over twenty-five years the 
government has feared to tread.”23 
Similarly, at one time, courts did not consider § 7212(a) to prohibit 
 
 19. S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 604 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
4621, 4784 (emphasis added) and in 2 Internal Revenue Acts of the United States, The Act of 1954 with 
Legislative Histories and Documents, 562, 604 (Bernard D. Reams Jr. ed., 1982). 
 20. See United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535, 1543 (11th Cir. 1991) (Roney, J., dissenting) 
(Section 7212(a)’s “legislative history reveals that that Congress intended only to prohibit interference 
with IRS agents, either through physical or verbal threats or through other actions which impeded their 
efforts to enforce the tax code.”); Robert S. Fink and Caroline Rule, The Growing Epidemic of Section 
7212(a) Prosecutions—Is Congress the Only Cure?, 88 J. Tax’n 356,  at 2 (“There is absolutely nothing 
in the legislative history that even intimates that the omnibus clause was intended to reach the whole 
gamut of acts which, through their effect on the reporting or payment of taxes, conceivably could be 
characterized as attempts to avoid the operation of the tax laws as a whole.”). 
 21. See United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696, 699 (8th Cir. 1981), superseded by statute on 
other grounds, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2393, as recognized in United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 
950, 956 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Our research, however, has disclosed no case brought by the Government under 
the more general omnibus clause of section 7212. We note, therefore, that the proper interpretation of this 
clause presents us with an issue of first impression, and that we proceed cautiously where for over twenty-
five years the Government has feared to tread.”). 
 22. See United States v. Henderson, 386 F. Supp. 1048, 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also Williams, 
644 F.2d at 699.   
 23. See Williams, 644 F.2d at 699. 
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merely any form of corrupt interference with the Internal Revenue laws.24  
At least one court previously construed § 7212(a) to prohibit only three 
harms: (1) corrupt solicitation of IRS agents or employees; (2) forceful 
interference with the Internal Revenue laws, or (3) the threat of forceful 
interference with the operation of the internal revenue laws.25 
Unlike most federal crimes, which can be prosecuted at will by any 
United States Attorney’s Office, all prosecutions arising under Title 26 
must be authorized by DOJ Tax Division.26  This policy is intended to 
secure uniform enforcement of the federal tax laws across all jurisdictions 
of the United States.27  To further ensure uniform enforcement, the Tax 
Division promulgates internal policy guidance about when prosecutions 
can be authorized.28  Because the Tax Division rarely, if ever, authorizes 
prosecutions that go against its own policy guidance, Tax Division 
guidance is generally the final word on when and how statutes are 
prosecuted under Title 26. 
In 1989, DOJ issued Tax Division Directive 77, which explained 
DOJ’s self-imposed limitations in charging defendants with § 7212(a).  
Tax Division Directive 77 stated that: 
 
In general, the use of the omnibus provision of Section 7212(a) 
should be reserved for conduct occurring after a tax return has been 
filed—typically conduct designed to impede or obstruct an audit or 
criminal tax investigation, when 18 U.S.C. § 371 charges are 
unavailable due to insufficient evidence of a conspiracy.29 
 
Directive 77 stated that § 7212(a) should be charged “consistent with 
the overall purpose of section § 7212(a), which is to penalize conduct 
aimed directly at IRS personnel in the performance of their duties, and at 
general IRS administration of the federal tax enforcement program, but 
not to penalize tax evasion as such.”30  Directive 77 gave examples of 
 
 24. See United States v. Walker, 514 F. Supp. 294, 303 (E.D. La. 1981). 
 25. See Walker, 514 F. Supp. at 303. 
 26. See United States Attorney’s Manual, 6-4.200 - Tax Division Jurisdiction and Procedures, 
available at https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-6-4000-criminal-tax-case-procedures#6-4.200.  
 27. See United States Attorney’s Manual, 6-4.010 - Federal Criminal Tax Enforcement, available 
at https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-6-4000-criminal-tax-case-procedures#6-4.010. 
 28. See United States Attorney’s Manual, 6-4.011 - Criminal Tax Manual and Other Tax Division 
Publications, available at https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-6-4000-criminal-tax-case-procedures#6-
4.011. 
 29. See Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 
1998) (No. 1:95-CR-199), (May 12, 1997), 1997 WL 34609476, at *7 (emphasis added). 
 30. See Kathryn Keneally, Hard Facts & Tax Protestors, White-Collar Crime, 21-AUG Champion 
25, August 1997, at 25; Brief of Defendant-Appellee James J. Kassouf, Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952 (6th Cir. 
1998) (No. 1:95-CR-199), 1996 WL 34386659; Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952 
(6th Cir. 1998) (No. 1:95-CR-199), (May 12, 1997), 1997 WL 34609476, at *7. 
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appropriate uses of the statute: “[c]ontinually assisting taxpayers in the 
filing of false returns or engaging in other conduct to make audits 
difficult; and other numerous large-scale violations of 26 U.S.C. Section 
7206(2) or 18 U.S.C. Section 287 (as it pertains to refund claims for other 
or fictitious taxpayers) . . . .”31 
Through this policy directive, the Tax Division placed an internal 
limitation on how far DOJ would push the bounds of § 7212(a).  The Tax 
Division would generally prosecute conduct under § 7212(a) only if that 
conduct was designed to impede a specific audit or investigation, or, 
absent a pending investigation, if the conduct represented a large-scale 
effort to evade the tax liability of third parties.32  As a result, the only 
prosecutions authorized under Directive 77, in large part, were those in 
which the defendant acted with the intent to delay or hinder an active IRS 
investigation or specifically to interfere with the administrative functions 
of the IRS.  Directive 77 made clear that the Tax Division did not see § 
7212(a) as a substitute for the crime of tax evasion.33 
By 1997, DOJ was expanding how it was charging the statute, although 
DOJ guidelines still kept the statute well reigned in.34  That year, the 
government charged several NBA referees with tax crimes, including the 
§ 7212(a) omnibus clause, for engaging in a scheme to evade their own 
individual taxes.35  The conduct in those cases did not strictly comply with 
Tax Division Directive 77 because it was not “aimed directly at IRS 
personnel in the performance of their duties,” nor was it aimed directly at 
 
 31. See Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 
1998) (No. 1:95-CR-199), (May 12, 1997), 1997 WL 34609476, at *7.  Title 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) is the 
crime of aiding and abetting the preparation of false tax returns, and 18 U.S.C. § 287 is the crime of filing 
false claims with the government.  See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1986). 
 32. It should be noted that DOJ policy does not limit § 7212(a) strictly to cases in which there is a 
pending IRS proceeding.  Rather, the policy suggests that § 7212(a) is most appropriate in cases where 
there is a pending IRS proceeding, but allows for exceptions to this rule.  As will be discussed later, the 
Supreme Court went further than DOJ policy and held that § 7212(a) requires the government to prove 
that the defendant was aware of a pending IRS action or proceeding or that such proceeding was 
foreseeable to him. 
 33. As Kathryn Keneally, then-tax law practitioner and later the head of the Tax Division, argued 
at the time Directive 77 was in force, Tax Division Policy Directive 77 “may actually provide the best 
guidance for the application of the omnibus clause of Section 7212(a).” See Keneally, supra note 30, at 
28. 
 34. See generally Fink & Rule, supra note 18 (arguing in 1998 that the Government had recently 
begun using 7212(a) more expansively); Keneally, supra note 30, at 28 (“Concern over the parameters of 
Section 7212(a) has been heightened in recent months as a result of prosecutions in a number of 
jurisdictions against referees of the National Basketball Association (NBA).”) 
 35. See United States v. Armstrong, 974 F. Supp. 528, 529-532 (D.C. Va. 1997); United States v. 
Toliver, 972 F. Supp. 1030, 1032-34 (D.C. Va. 1997); United States v. Mathis, No. CR-1-97-15, 1997 
WL 683648, at *3-4 (S.D. Ohio June 2, 1997); Fink & Rule, supra note 18; CBS Sportsline, IRS Busts 
Another Ref, CBS News, December 19, 1998, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/irs-busts-another-ref/ (Last 
visited August 3, 2017). 
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“general IRS administration of the federal tax enforcement program.”  
Rather, the conduct in those cases appeared to be standard, garden-variety 
tax evasion.36  This was apparently the first time the DOJ had charged § 
7212(a) inconsistently with its own policy to prosecute individuals under 
§ 7212(a) for what essentially amounted to tax evasion, and represented 
an expansion in the type of conduct DOJ typically prosecuted under § 
7212(a).37 
In 2004, the Tax Division issued Directive 129, currently in force, 
which superseded Directive 77 but maintained similar limitations on the 
use of the omnibus clause under § 7212(a) to cases occurring after an IRS 
audit or investigation. 38  Directive 129 states that charges under  
§ 7212(a) are most appropriate to penalize “corrupt conduct that is 
intended to impede an IRS audit or investigation,” including “providing 
false information, destroying evidence, attempting to influence a witness 
to give false testimony, and harassing an IRS employee.”39  Additionally, 
Directive 129 notes that a “§ 7212(a) omnibus clause charge can also be 
authorized in appropriate circumstances to prosecute a person who, prior 
to any audit or investigation, engaged in large-scale obstructive conduct 
involving the tax liability of third parties.”40 Directive 129 provides 
examples of obstructive conduct under § 7212(a) as “assisting in 
preparing or filing a large number of fraudulent returns or other tax 
forms, or engaging in other corrupt conduct designed to obstruct the IRS 
from carrying out its lawful functions.”41  Thus, DOJ Policy remains 
relatively consistent that § 7212(a) should be used primarily in cases of 
direct interference with an IRS action or proceeding, or in the case of 
large-scale obstructive conduct intended to obstruct the IRS from carrying 
out its lawful functions.  
Like Directive 77, Directive 129 cautions that “[t]he omnibus clause 
should not be used as a substitute for a charge directly related to tax 
liability—such as tax evasion or filing a false tax return—if such a charge 
is readily provable.”  Tax Division guidance has consistently opined that 
§ 7212(a) is most appropriate to punish attempts to interfere with pending 
audits or investigations or in other obstructive cases involving large-scale 
 
 36. The various defendants, NBA referees, engaged in a scheme to underreport income they 
received for “downgrading” first class airline tickets. See Armstrong, 974 F. Supp. at 530-31; Fink & 
Rule, supra note 18, at 362-63. 
 37. See Fink & Rule, supra note 18, at 362. 
 38. See Dep’t of Just., Crim. Tax Manual, 3.00 Tax Div. Pol’y Directives & Memoranda, 49 
(2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tax/legacy/2014/08/05/CTM%20Chapter%203.pdf#Directive
%20No.%20129 (emphasis added). 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. (emphasis added). 
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conduct and the tax liabilities of third parties.  Aside from briefing and 
argument in specific cases, the Tax Division has never taken the official 
position that § 7212(a) is a “catch-all” tax crime that encompasses every 
corrupt act that makes it harder for the IRS to assess or collect taxes. 
C. The Momentum of a Circuit Split: How the Sixth Circuit’s Flip-
Flop-Flip Influenced the Expansion of § 7212(a) 
Notwithstanding the legislative history and DOJ guidance limiting the 
scope of § 7212(a), several circuits expanded the statute to reach conduct 
that occurred before, or in the absence of, an IRS action or proceeding.42  
Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Marinello III in March 2018, there 
was a circuit split, with only the Sixth Circuit limiting prosecutions under 
the statute to conduct aimed at pending IRS proceedings, while the First, 
Second, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits declined to adopt such a 
limitation.43  One incredibly interesting aspect about the development of 
the circuit split is that the Sixth Circuit actually reversed itself—twice—
on the issue, before landing back where it began and stating that § 7212(a) 
does indeed contain a “pending action” requirement.44  This double 
reversal of course by the Sixth Circuit, in conjunction with various courts’ 
textual and contextual readings of § 7212(a), seems to have played into 
the development of the circuit split.   
The Sixth Circuit began by imposing a “pending IRS action” 
requirement in United States v. Kassouf in 1998.45  In Kassouf, the Sixth 
Circuit became the first circuit court to address whether, to be convicted 
under § 7212(a)’s omnibus clause, the defendant must have been aware 
of a pending IRS investigation or proceeding.46  The court held that § 
7212(a) did contain such a requirement, reasoning that § 7212(a) was 
analogous to the general obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, 
and should be read the same way.47  While § 7212(a) prohibited corrupt 
conduct designed to obstruct the “due administration” of the Internal 
Revenue Laws, 18 U.S.C. § 1503 prohibited whoever “corruptly or by 
threats or force or by any threatening letter or communications, 
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct or 
impede, the due administration of justice . . . .”48 Because the Sixth Circuit 
 
 42. See note 3, supra. 
 43. See id.  
 44. See United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Bowman, 
173 F.3d 595, 600 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 45. See Kassouf, 144 F.3d at 955. 
 46. Kassouf, 144 F.3d at 955. 
 47. United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 956 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 48. Id. at 956 (emphasis added). 
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concluded that § 1503 and § 7212(a) contained “nearly identical 
language,” the court held that § 7212(a) required “some pending IRS 
action of which the defendant was aware.”49  The court also noted 
concerns with the speculative nature of obstructive conduct that occurred 
prior to any IRS audit or tax return, and construed the criminal statute 
narrowly, in accordance with the principle that criminal statutes should 
provide fair notice to the public about what conduct is criminal.50   
Just one year after Kassouf, the Sixth Circuit reversed course in United 
States v. Bowman, purporting to limit Kassouf to its facts.51 Bowman held 
that obstructive acts that occurred before the IRS had initiated an action 
or proceeding were sufficient to support a conviction under § 7212(a).52  
The defendant in Bowman was a tax protestor53 who had filed several 
bogus documents with the IRS in an attempt to harass his creditors.54  The 
court limited Kassouf to its facts, concerned that otherwise the 
government could not charge a defendant like Bowman under § 7212(a) 
when his clear intent was to obstruct the IRS.55  The court held that § 
7212(a) charges did not require the government to prove that there was a 
pending IRS proceeding at the time of the defendant’s corrupt conduct if 
the defendant deliberately filed forms with the IRS for the purpose of 
causing the IRS to initiate an action.56 
It was not until 2014, in the case of United States v. Miner, that the 
Sixth Circuit reaffirmed Kassouf and disavowed Bowman.57  The court 
examined the tensions between Kassouf and Bowman and resolved the 
apparent conflict between the cases by explaining that Kassouf stated a 
general rule, while Bowman stood for the more specific proposition that 
a defendant who intentionally attempts to cause the IRS to initiate 
frivolous proceedings cannot claim he did not have the requisite intent to 
obstruct that proceeding.58  The court thus reaffirmed the principle that “a 
 
 49. Id. As will be discussed later in this section, several courts have disagreed with the Kassouf 
court’s conclusion that § 7212(a) and § 1503 are nearly identical.  
 50. Id. at 957-58. 
 51. See United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 595, 600 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 52. See id. 
 53. Tax protestors are individuals who obstinately refuse to acknowledge their civic duty to pay 
taxes and who engage in myriad annoying and harassing tactics to make the IRS’s job harder.  Today, the 
Tax Division refers to “tax protestors” as “tax defiers.”  See John A. Townsend, Tax Obstruction Crimes: 
Is Making the IRS’s Job Harder Enough?, 9 Hous. Bus. & Tax L. J. 255, 301 n. 211 (2009). 
 54. Bowman, 173 F.3d at 596-97. 
 55. Id. at 600. 
 56. Id.  
 57. See United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 58. To resolve the conflict, the Sixth Circuit explained that, “[t]o the extent that Kassouf and 
Bowman conflict, of course, the first-in-time (Kassouf) controls.” The court explained that Kassouf and 
Bowman are not reconcilable because the arguments in Bowman were the same arguments Judge 
Daughtrey had made in her dissent in Kassouf.  The court concluded that “Bowman, therefore, is largely 
predicated upon a rationale that had already lost in this court a year before it was decided.”  Miner, 774 
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defendant may not be convicted under the omnibus clause unless he is 
‘acting in response to some pending IRS action of which he is aware.’”59   
Between Bowman and Miner, however, several courts considered 
whether § 7212(a) contained a pending action requirement.60  Every other 
court to consider the question held that there was no such requirement; 
the Sixth Circuit’s indecisiveness seems to have had a marked impact on 
those decisions.61  
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit held, in United States v. Massey, that § 
7212(a) did not require the government to prove that the defendant was 
aware of a pending IRS action.62  This was the first post-Kassouf federal 
appeals court decision on the issue, but the court did not even mention 
Kassouf or Bowman.63  In fact, the opinion contains almost no analysis of 
the issue, and the case the court cited in support did not address the issue.64  
The Ninth Circuit’s decision that § 7212(a) does not have a “pending 
action” requirement therefore added little analysis to the question 
presented in Kassouf.    There is no evidence that the court was even aware 
of Kassouf or Bowman (Miner had not been decided yet), or the tensions 
underlying those decisions.  The court did not analogize to § 1503 or cite 
the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of United States v. Aguilar, 
which were the bases of the reasoning in Kassouf.65  Thus, it is unclear 
how thoroughly the Ninth Circuit actually considered the question, or 
even if it even realized that it was creating a circuit split. 
 
F.3d at 343-45. 
 59. Id. at 345. Despite its holding on § 7212(a), the court upheld the conviction, explaining that 
any error was harmless because there was “ample evidence that Miner was aware of one or more pending 
IRS proceedings when he corruptly attempted to obstruct the IRS’s administration of the tax laws . . . .” 
Id. at 346. 
 60. See United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Wood, 384 F. 
App’x. 698, 700 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 61. See id. 
 62. Massey, 419 F.3d at 1010. 
 63. Id.   
 64. See Massey, 419 F.3d at 1009-10; United States v. Kuball, 976 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1992).  
Interestingly, United States v. Kuball, the case the Ninth Circuit cited in Massey in support of its decision 
that 7212(a) did not directly or indirectly address that question whether the defendant must be aware of a 
pending IRS proceeding at the time he engaged in corrupt obstructive conduct. See Kuball, 976 F.2d at 
531.  Similar to the defendant in Bowman, the defendant in Kuball was a tax protestor.  See id. at 530-31. 
The obstructive conduct in Kuball consisted of the defendant filing false tax returns and supporting 
documents with the IRS and sending threatening letters to the IRS and his former employer requesting tax 
related information. See id. Rather than standing for the broad rejection of a “pending action” requirement 
that the court in Massey used it to support, Kuball merely affirmed a 7212(a) conviction even though there 
did not appear to be any allegation that the defendant was aware of a pending IRS action at the time he 
filed the forms and sent the letters. See id. The defendant did not argue, nor did the court address, whether 
7212(a) requires a pending IRS action at the time of the crime. See id. Similar to the defendant in Bowman, 
the defendant in Kuball clearly intended his actions to obstruct the administration of the IRS. See id.  
 65. See Massey, 419 F.3d at 1008-10; United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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In 2010, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in rejecting a 
“pending IRS action” requirement in § 7212(a) in the unpublished opinion 
United States v. Wood.66  In that case, the defendant, a New York attorney, 
was convicted under § 7212(a)’s omnibus clause for using nominee 
accounts and offshore bank accounts and offshore debit cards to hide from 
the IRS millions of dollars of income to himself and third parties.67  The 
defendant claimed that his “religious beliefs” prevented him from filing 
federal income taxes, which he had not done since the mid-1980’s.68 
The Tenth Circuit rejected the “pending IRS proceeding” requirement 
in large part because, at the time Wood was issued, Kassouf appeared to 
have been largely limited and restricted to its facts by Bowman.69  The 
court disagreed with Kassouf’s conclusion that § 7212(a) was similar to § 
1503.70  The Tenth Circuit explained that Kassouf was further 
unpersuasive because it had been rejected by other courts.71  In support of 
this proposition, the court cited Massey, which, as previously discussed, 
contained scant analysis about that provision, along with two district court 
cases.72  The two district court cases also declined to impose a “pending 
IRS action” requirement in § 7212(a) prosecutions based at least in part 
on the fact that Kassouf had been strictly construed and limited by 
Bowman.73  In 2015, in United States v. Sorensen, the Tenth Circuit 
solidified Wood and formalized its holding that § 7212(a) does not require 
proof that there was an ongoing IRS audit or proceeding at the time the 
defendant engaged in corrupt conduct.74  The court reaffirmed its 
reasoning in Wood that § 1503 and § 7212(a) are “substantially 
different.”75 
 
 66. 384 Fed. App’x. 698 (10th Cir. 2010).   
 67. United States v. Wood, 384 F. App’x. 698, 700 (10th Cir. 2010).   
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 704. Before turning to its own analysis of 7212(a), the Tenth Circuit noted that the 
defendant’s argument “relie[d] entirely on precedent from the Sixth Circuit.” Id. at 703. The court then 
gave a brief synopsis of the reasoning in Kassouf before it concluded that Kassouf was unpersuasive 
because it had been limited to its holding and facts by Bowman. Id. at 704 (citation omitted). 
 70. United States v. Wood, 384 Fed. App’x 698, 704 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id.; United States v. Willner, No. 07 Cr. 183, 2007 WL 2963711, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 
2007) (basing its conclusion that 7212(a) does not require the defendant to be aware of a pending IRS 
proceeding at the time of his obstructive conduct in part on the fact that Kassouf was largely overruled by 
Bowman, as well as the court’s view that 7212(a) is much broader than 1503); United States v. Kelly, 564 
F. Supp.2d 843, 844 (N. D. Ill. 2008) (rejection challenge to 7212(a) based on “pending action” 
requirement because (1) the weight of authority does not restrict the statute, noting that Kassouf was 
limited to its precise facts by Bowman, (2) the language of 7212(a) is broad, and (3) the legislative history 
is ambiguous). 
 74. See United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217, 1232 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 
1163 (2016) (“7212(a) does not require an ongoing proceeding . . . .”). 
 75. Id. at 1232. 
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The next court to jump into the fray was the First Circuit in 2014, 
joining the Tenth and Ninth Circuits in rejecting the “pending IRS action” 
limitation on § 7212(a).76  In United States v. Floyd, the defendants had 
operated two large-scale schemes to aid third parties in evading taxes.77  
The First Circuit summarily dismissed the defendants’ arguments that § 
7212(a) requires proof of an ongoing audit.78  The court did not engage in 
any analysis on the point, but merely cited the unpublished Tenth Circuit 
opinion in Wood.79  The court did note in a footnote that it was aware of 
the opinion in Kassouf, but declined to follow Kassouf because it had been 
limited to its precise facts.80   
In United States v. Marinello (“Marinello I”), the Second Circuit joined 
the Tenth, Ninth, and First Circuits in holding that § 7212(a) does not 
require a pending IRS action to sustain a conviction.81  Strikingly, the 
court also held that a § 7212(a) violation could be premised on an 
omission, rather than an affirmative act.82  This represented an expansion 
of the statute even beyond the other circuits that have refused to require a 
pending IRS proceeding.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and 
reversed the conviction in Marinello III, as discussed in more detail 
below.83 
  In May, 2017, in United States v. Westbrooks, the Fifth Circuit joined 
the First, Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in holding that § 7212(a) does 
not require that there was a pending IRS action at the time the defendant 
engaged in corrupt conduct.84  In upholding the conviction, the court 
explained that it was joining “a majority of the circuits to consider the 
question” whether § 7212(a) required a pending IRS action.85  Tracking 
the reasoning of the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit found that the text 
 
 76. See United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2014).   
 77. Id. at 26-27. 
 78. Id. at 32. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 32 n. 4. 
 81. See United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 222 (2d Cir. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 138 
S.Ct. 1101 (2018). 
 82. Id. at 224-25. 
 83. Marinello v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018).  
 84. See United States v. Westbrooks, 858 F.3d 317, 322-23 (5th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded, 
138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018). 
 85. Id. The court did note that “[o]f the five circuits to directly address the issue, only the first to 
consider the question adopted Westbrooks's position, and one judge dissented from that ruling…. Four 
have since held that section 7212(a) does not require an ongoing IRS action.”  Id. (citing United States v. 
Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 955-58 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 32 n.4 (1st Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 222 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2017 WL 1079367 (U.S. June 
27, 2017) (No. 16-1144); United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217, 1232 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1163 (2016).) As for the outlier 
case with one dissenter, the court was, of course, referring to Kassouf. 
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of § 7212(a) was “substantially different” from § 1503 because the 
general obstruction statute was tied to court proceedings, whereas § 
7212(a) relates to administration of the entire tax code, and the actual 
phrases “due administration of justice” and “due administration of this 
title” were different.86  The court noted that in previous cases under § 
7212(a), the government had never been required to prove that the 
defendant was aware of a pending IRS proceeding.87  The court finally 
seemed persuaded by the fact that a broad reading of  
§ 7212(a) seemed to comport with its purpose to “prevent frustration of 
tax collection efforts.”88  In March 2018, the Supreme Court vacated and 
remanded this case to the Fifth Circuit in light of Marinello III.89 
The impact that Bowman’s reversal of Kassouf had on the circuit split 
cannot be understated.  Almost every court that came after Bowman cited 
its limitation of Kassouf’s holding in support of an expansive 
interpretation of § 7212(a).90  While many of the courts that came after 
Bowman and before Miner did engage in some analysis on the proper 
scope of § 7212(a) vis-à-vis § 1503, most courts had already dismissed 
the defendant’s argument for a narrow reading of the statute based on their 
read that Kassouf had been abrogated by Bowman.91   
After Bowman, the split gained momentum with each court that joined 
the side of a broad § 7212(a).  The first Court of Appeals to consider the 
issue after Bowman was the Ninth Circuit in Massey, and that court did 
not spend much time analyzing the issue.92  Next came the unpublished 
Fifth Circuit opinion in Wood, which noted Bowman’s strict limitation of 
Kassouf.93  Although the court did conduct its own textual analysis of § 
7212(a), its starting point was the fact that Kassouf appeared to be bad 
law.94  Next came Floyd, which did not engage in any analysis about § 
7212(a) except to cite Wood and note that Kassouf had been limited to its 
 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 323. 
 88. Id. at 324. 
 89. Westbrooks v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1323 (2018).  
 90. See United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 222 (2d Cir. 2016), rev’d and remanded, 138 
S.Ct. 1101 (2018); United States v. Westbrooks, 858 F.3d 317, 322-23 (5th Cir. May 24, 2017), rev’d and 
remanded, 138 S.Ct. 1323; United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 32 n.4 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217, 1232 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1163 (2016); United States v. 
Wood, 384 F. App’x 698, 700 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 
2005); but see United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that § 7212(a) does 
require the government to prove that the defendant’s conduct occurred while there was a known, pending 
IRS proceeding).  
 91. See id.  
 92. See Massey, 419 F.3d at 1009-10. 
 93. See Wood, 384 Fed. App’x at 700. 
 94. See id. 
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precise facts.95  By the time the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue again in 
Sorensen, four Courts of Appeals, including the Fifth Circuit’s own 
unpublished opinion, at least appeared to agree that § 7212(a) did not 
require a pending IRS action.  The Sorensen court acknowledged in a 
footnote that Miner had reaffirmed Kassouf,96 but by then the momentum 
of the circuit split clearly favored not imposing a “pending IRS action” 
requirement in § 7212(a). 
While of course it is impossible to say whether the Sixth Circuit would 
have solely occupied the side of the debate limiting § 7212(a) were it not 
the opinion in Bowman, that decision seems to have impacted the way the 
law developed about whether § 7212(a) has a pending IRS action 
prerequisite.  
D. An IRS Proceeding “in the offing:” Resolving the Circuit Split in 
Marinello v. United States 
In Marinello III, the Supreme Court finally resolved the circuit split 
about the proper scope of § 7212(a), holding that to prove a violation of 
§ 7212(a), the Government must show both a “nexus” between the 
defendant’s obstructive conduct and an administrative proceeding, and 
also that the proceeding was pending, or at least reasonably foreseeable, 
at the time the defendant engaged in that conduct.97 
In Marinello III,98 the defendant did not file personal or business tax 
returns for at least fifteen years.99  He also failed to keep books and 
records related to his courier business, paid employees in cash and did not 
issue any Forms 1099 or Forms W2, and used business funds to pay 
personal expenses.100  Marinello received advice from both a tax lawyer 
and an accountant that he needed to file tax returns and maintain his 
business records so that returns could be prepared, but still Marinello did 
not start maintaining books and records or filing tax returns.101  On a 
previous occasion, the IRS had investigated Marinello, but closed the 
 
 95. See United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 96. See United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217, 1232 n. 9 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S.Ct. 1163 (2016). 
 97. Marinello v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101, 1109 (2018).  
 98. The facts that form the basis of the opinions in the Second Circuit (“Marinello I”), the dissent 
from denial of en banc review (“Marinello II”), and the Supreme Court’s opinion (“Marinello III”) are 
the same.  
 99. United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 211-12 (2d Cir. 2016), rev’d and remanded 138 
S.Ct. 1101 (2018). 
 100. Id. at 211-12. 
 101. Id. at 212. 
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investigation before Marinello ever knew about it.102  When Marinello 
and his business were finally audited by the IRS again, Marinello was 
completely unapologetic.103  He acknowledged he knew should have paid 
taxes but “never got around to it.” 104  He said he shredded his business 
records because “that’s what he had been doing all along,” and admitted 
that he “took the easy way out.”105  Marinello was charged with one count 
of § 7212(a) and eight counts of misdemeanor failure to file taxes under 
§ 7203.106  The indictment alleged that Marinello failed to maintain books 
and records and that he failed to turn over all of his records to his 
accountant.  The Second Circuit held that these omissions were sufficient 
to constitute obstruction under § 7212(a).107 
In Marinello I, the Second Circuit refused to adopt the “pending IRS 
action” limitation on § 7212(a), explaining that § 7212(a) was distinct 
from § 1503.108  The court also noted that there was no legislative history 
indicating that Congress intended the statute to be construed narrowly.109  
In addition to refusing to require a pending IRS proceeding subsequent to 
a § 7212(a) conviction, the court additionally stated such conviction could 
be premised on an omission, rather than an affirmative act.110  The court 
also rejected the defendant’s challenge to § 7212(a) on grounds that the 
statute was vague and overbroad.111  The court noted that previous courts 
had similarly rejected vagueness and overbreadth challenges to § 7212(a), 
and concluded that the mens rea requirement that the conduct be 
accomplished “corruptly” sufficiently restricted the omnibus clause.112  
Marinello requested and was denied en banc review of the Second 
Circuit’s decision.113  However, in a strongly-worded dissent from the 
denial of en banc review (“Marinello II”), two Second Circuit judges 
disagreed with the panel’s denial of en banc review.114  Judge Jacobs, who 
authored the dissent, expressed concern that “nobody [was] safe” if the 
defendant’s conviction was allowed to stand because that conviction 
could have been based on a number of otherwise innocuous actions, such 
 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 211-12 (2d Cir. 2016), rev’d and remanded 138 
S.Ct. 1101 (2018). 
 106. Id. at 212-13. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 219-20. 
 109. Id. at 221. 
 110. Id. at 224-25. 
 111. Marinello I, 839 F.3d at 221-22. 
 112. Id. at 222. 
 113. See United States v. Marinello (“Marinello II”), 855 F.3d 455 (2d. Cir. 2017) (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting from denial of en banc review). 
 114. Id. (Jacobs, J., and Cabranes, J., dissenting). 
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as failing to maintain records, destroying records, or failing to give 
records to his accountant.115  Most particularly, Judge Jacobs expressed 
fervent concerns that unless § 7212(a) was limited to conduct that 
occurred after a defendant learned of a pending IRS action, the statute 
would become unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it would 
“afford the sort of capricious, unbounded, and oppressive opportunity for 
prosecutorial abuse that the Supreme Court has repeatedly curtailed.”116  
In Judge Jacobs view, the requirement that the conduct be accomplished 
“corruptly” did not remedy this overbreadth and potential for 
prosecutorial abuse, because gaining an unlawful benefit for oneself or 
another is so akin to lawful aggressive tax avoidance that innocent citizens 
are likely to be ensnared in the penumbra of the statute based upon legal 
behavior.117  Judge Jacobs explained that he declined to defer to DOJ’s 
view about the scope of the statute, stating that “[a]t some point, 
prosecutors must encounter boundaries to discretion, so that no American 
prosecutor can say, ‘Show me the man and I’ll find you the crime.’”118 
In Marinello III, the Supreme Court held that, to establish a violation 
of § 7212(a), the Government must prove “that there is a ‘nexus’ between 
the defendant’s conduct and a particular administrative proceeding, such 
as an investigation, and audit, or other targeted administrative action.”119  
The Court explained that the “nexus requires a ‘relationship in time, 
causation, or logic with the [administrative] proceeding.”120  The Court 
went on to say that the concept of a “particular administrative proceeding” 
does not include every act carried out by IRS employees in furtherance of 
their duties, and does not include “routine, day-to-day work carried out in 
the ordinary course by the IRS, such as the review of tax returns.”121  In 
addition to the “nexus” requirement, the Court held that the Government 
must prove that, when the defendant engaged in obstructive conduct, the 
action was pending, or was at least reasonably foreseeable by the 
defendant.122  
The Court took as a starting point the Supreme Court decision of 
United States v. Aguilar, which interpreted the general obstruction of 
justice provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1503.123  In Aguilar, the Supreme Court 
 
 115. Id. at 456. 
 116. Id. at 457 (2d. Cir. 2017) (Jacobs, J., dissenting from denial of en banc review). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 459. 
 119. Marinello v. United States (“Marinello III”), 138 S.Ct. 1101, 1109 (2018). 
 120. Id. (citing Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599 and Wood, 6 F.3d at 696).  
 121. Id. at 1110.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id.  
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solidified that § 1503 required the government to prove that the 
defendant’s obstructive conduct bore a “nexus” to a pending judicial 
proceeding.124  In Aguilar, the Supreme Court explained that actions such 
as “uttering false statements to an investigating agent . . . who might or 
might not testify before a grand jury [was] [in]sufficient to make out a 
violation of the catchall provision of § 1503.”125  The Court in Aguilar 
limited § 1503 in part out of deference to Congressional prerogative about 
the scope of the statute, and because the Court wanted to ensure proper 
notice to the defendant about what conduct was criminalized by § 1503.126 
Like the court in Aguilar, the Supreme Court in Marinello III explained 
that the Court has traditionally exercised restraint in interpreting criminal 
statutes out of a desire to defer to Congressional intent.127  The Court 
concluded that Congressional intent in the text of § 7212(a) was “neutral,” 
because the statutory words “obstruct or impede” are broad, but the verbs 
“obstruct” and “impede” suggest an object (such as a particular person or 
proceeding).128  However, the Court found that the statutory context in 
which § 7212(a) was enacted suggested that the omnibus provision was 
limited to particular administrative proceedings.129  This was because the 
omnibus provision was located immediately after a prohibition against 
intimidating or impeding “any officer or employee of the United States 
acting in an official capacity” and before a phrase dealing with any 
“property” seized under the Internal Revenue Code.130  This, the Court 
reasoned, meant that the omnibus provision was intended as a “catchall” 
provision to encompass any conduct directed at identifiable persons or 
property, but not as a catchall to encompass every violation that interfered 
with the administration of the IRS generally.131   
Although many previous courts have averred that the legislative history 
surrounding the enactment of § 7212(a) is silent on the intended scope of 
the omnibus clause,132 the Supreme Court found that the legislative 
 
 124. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599-600 (1995). 
 125. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600; United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 957 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 126. See Aguilar at 600. 
 127. Marinello III, 584 U.S. at 1106. 
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 1107. 
 130. Id. at 1106-07 
 131. Id. at 1107. 
 132. See United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696, 699 n. 13 (8th Cir. 1981), superseded by statute 
on other grounds, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2393, as recognized in United States v. Brooks, 174 
F.3d 950, 956 (8th Cir. 1999) (“This legislative history is virtually useless with respect to the issue before 
us, however, because it is wholly silent on § 7212’s omnibus clause.”); United States v. Mitchell, 985 
F.2d 1275, 1279 (4th Cir. 1993) (“We do not find the history particularly enlightening or dispositive as to 
Congress's understanding of the precise scope of the omnibus provision.”); United States v. Kelly, 564 F. 
Supp.2d 843, 844 (N. D. Ill. 2008) (stating that the legislative history of 7212(a) “is—at best—
ambiguous” and explaining that while both the Senate and House reports refer to 7212(a) as punishing 
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history supported a more limited scope of § 7212(a).133  The Court further 
found that nothing in the legislative history of § 7212(a) suggested that 
the Omnibus clause was a “catchall” to punish all conduct otherwise in 
violation of the Tax Code.134  Rather, the House and Senate reports both 
indicate that § 7212(a) makes it a crime to obstruct a specific, identifiable 
IRS agent.135  As the Court pointed out, the Tax Code includes numerous 
misdemeanors, such as failure to file tax returns under § 7203. An 
expansive reading of § 7212(a) would transform those misdemeanors into 
felonies, rendering other, more specific provision of the Tax Code 
redundant.136  
Next, the Court found that reading § 7212(a) too broadly would not 
ensure fair warning to putative defendants about what conduct is 
criminal.137  In the Court’s view, the requirement that the conduct be done 
“corruptly” (as opposed to the mens rea “willfully” typically found in tax 
crimes) did not save the statute from overbreadth.138  Although the 
Supreme Court did not specifically ground its analysis in a Due Process 
context, as other courts have done,139 it did note the concerns that a broad 
reading of § 7212(a) would not provide fair warning to the public about 
what conduct that statute criminalizes.140  The Supreme Court gave 
several examples of low-level misdemeanor criminal tax offenses, such 
as paying a babysitter $41 per week in cash without withholding taxes, 
that could be charged as a felony violation of § 7212(a) if the statute was 
 
threats or threatening acts against IRS agents or employees, “they are silent on the significance of the 
omnibus clause.”). 
 133. Marinello v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101, 1107 (2018).  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 1108.  
 138. Id. 
 139. See United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 958 (6th Cir. 1998). Similar to the Supreme 
Court’s overbreadth analysis in Aguilar with respect to § 1503, in Kassouf, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
that if § 7212(a) was not limited to pending actions, the statute would be open to constitutional challenges 
for vagueness and overbreadth because it would not provide notice of what conduct was criminal. See 
Kassouf at 958. The court explained that the “due administration of [Title 26]” encompassed “a vast range 
of activities of the Internal Revenue code, including: mailing out internal revenue forms; answering 
taxpayers’ inquiries; receiving, processing, recording, and maintaining tax returns, payments and other 
taxpayer submissions; as well as monitoring taxpayers’ compliance with their obligations.” Id. at 956. 
The court noted that the IRS audits only a small percentage of tax returns. Id.  Thus, the court found that 
unless the statute required that the defendant knew about a pending IRS proceeding, it was highly 
speculative whether conduct such as failing to maintain books and records would actually impede the IRS. 
Id. A broad reading of § 7212(a) would therefore provide inadequate notice to a defendant that failing to 
keep records was criminal, because he may not have had any idea that such conduct might someday 
obstruct the IRS’s efforts to assess his taxes. Id. 
 140. Marinello v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101, 1108 (2018).  
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not limited to specific IRS actions.141 
Finally, the Supreme Court expressed concern that a broad reading of 
§ 7212(a) would risk allowing “policemen, prosecutors, and juries to 
pursue their personal predilections.”142  The Court explained that it could 
not reply on prosecutorial discretion to narrow the scope of § 7212(a).143  
The Court noted that, while the Government had prosecuted the omnibus 
provision only sparingly when the statute was first enacted, the 
Government had used the clause more often after the early 1990s.144  The 
Court noted that the Government maintained a policy to charge a more 
punitive provision over a less punitive criminal provision if both apply to 
the defendant’s conduct.145  
III. HOW COURTS PREVIOUSLY RELIED ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF § 7212(A) 
It is a longstanding tenant of criminal law that the government retains 
broad discretion in charging decisions.146  This concept is particularly 
relevant with respect to § 7212(a), because DOJ has traditionally limited 
the scope of prosecutions under that provision.  In fact, as previously 
discussed, the first time DOJ charged the omnibus clause was in 1981, 
even though the statute was enacted in 1954. 147  However, while DOJ has 
traditionally prosecuted under § 7212(a) conduct that impacts a specific 
IRS proceeding, until Marinello III, § 7212(a) had been broadened by the 
courts so that virtually any act of malfeasance related to filing or paying 
taxes was a possible violation of § 7212(a).  Thus, prosecutorial restraint, 
not judicial boundary-setting, was the only limiting factor in whether an 
individual was charged with § 7212(a), whether he was charged with 
misdemeanor § 7203, or whether he faced no charges at all.   
While courts are tasked with the job of interpreting federal criminal 
statutes to determine their scope, DOJ decides which criminal statutes it 
will prosecute and to what extent.  These two roles are distinct but work 
in harmony.  Courts delineate how far the government may go in 
prosecuting an individual under a criminal statute, and DOJ thereafter 
issues policy statements and internal guidance within the boundaries set 
by the courts.  From a legal perspective, DOJ policy should be issued 
 
 141. Id.  
 142. Id. (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)). 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Id.  
 146. See United States v. Armstrong (“Armstrong II”), 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). 
 147. See United States v. Williams, 644 F.2d 696, 699 (8th Cir. 1981), superseded by statute on 
other grounds, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2393, as recognized in United States v. Brooks, 174 F.3d 
950, 956 (8th Cir. 1999). 
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based on judicial interpretation of the criminal statutes, not the other way 
around.  However, as will be discussed in this Part, sometimes DOJ policy 
can impact the way courts interpret criminal statutes.  
Courts have considered DOJ policy limiting the scope of § 7212(a) 
when deciding that § 7212(a) does not require a defendant to have been 
aware of a pending IRS requirement at the time he engaged in corrupt 
obstructive conduct.  At least some of the courts considering whether  
§ 7212(a) should require a “pending IRS action” have also considered Tax 
Division guidance that has traditionally limited the scope of how § 
7212(a) is charged.  Thus, courts have clearly been aware of DOJ 
guidance in this context. 
Further, the historical charging restraint exercised by DOJ, which 
limits the scope of how § 7212(a) has been charged, impacted judicial 
review of the scope of the omnibus clause.  DOJ, by issuing policy 
statements about how the statute could be used, limited what cases were 
available for judicial review.  DOJ policy has usually ensured that courts 
declining to limit the ambit of § 7212(a) have primarily considered cases 
in which the conduct was obstructive of a specific IRS proceeding.   
Finally, DOJ guidance limiting the statute has ensured that 
constitutional vagueness and overbreadth challenges to § 7212(a) have 
necessarily failed, because the conduct was typically within even a narrow 
reading of the statute.  
A. Courts Have Turned to DOJ Policy Limiting § 7212(a) When 
Interpreting the Statute 
In considering whether § 7212(a) contains a “pending IRS action” 
requirement, some appellate courts considered Tax Division guidance 
limiting the use of the statute.  In Kassouf in the Sixth Circuit, the parties 
argued that the § 7212(a) charges were inconsistent with internal DOJ 
guidance, which makes it apparent that the court was aware of the 
guidance when ruling on the § 7212(a) question.148  Further, in two recent 
Courts of Appeals cases under § 7212(a)—Marinello I and Sorensen—
the Second and Eleventh Circuits addressed the Tax Division directives 
that limit the prosecutorial scope of the statute.149  However, these courts 
did not acknowledge what role DOJ policy played in limiting the cases 
that make their way to judicial review. 
In Kassouf, the Sixth Circuit limited § 7212(a) despite the fact that DOJ 
 
 148. See United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 958 (6th Cir. 1998).  
 149. See United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 222 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 2017 WL 
1079367 (U.S. June 27, 2017)( No. 16-1144); United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217, 1226-27 (10th 
Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 1163 (2016). 
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had in place at the time self-imposed limitations on bringing charges 
under the statute.150  The Kassouf court was clearly aware what DOJ 
policy was at the time of the opinion because the parties argued about the 
policy in their briefs.151  In his principle brief, the defendant-appellee 
asserted that the court’s reading of a “pending action” requirement into § 
7212(a) was consistent with DOJ policy.152  DOJ policy at the time was 
Tax Division Directive 77, which stated “the use of the ‘omnibus’ 
provision of Section 7212(a) should be reserved for conduct occurring 
after a tax return has been filed—typically conduct designed to impede or 
obstruct an audit or criminal tax investigation, when 18 U.S.C. § 371 
charges are unavailable due to insufficient evidence or a conspiracy.”153  
The government-appellant contended that charging the defendant in 
Kassouf with § 7212(a) was not inconsistent with DOJ policy, but that 
even if it was, that fact was legally irrelevant because DOJ policy did not 
confer any substantive rights on defendants.154   
Although the Kassouf court never directly mentioned DOJ policy, the 
court expressed concern that “[i]n this day, when Congress is attempting 
to curb the reach of the IRS into the homes of taxpayers, we cannot 
construe a penal law such as § 7212(a) to permit such an invasion into the 
activities of lawabiding citizens.”155  This statement demonstrates that the 
court recognized a broad judicial interpretation of the statute may lead to 
a broader swath of prosecutions, perhaps reaching conduct that did not 
obstruct a specific IRS proceeding.  The court, clearly uncomfortable with 
the idea that DOJ and the IRS might expand the scope of prosecutions 
under the statute, therefore chose to impose judicial limitations as a 
safeguard against the statute’s overuse. 
Although Executive Branch policy statements are not binding on courts 
considering the scope of a statute,156 both the Second Circuit and the 
Tenth Circuit turned to Tax Division guidance when declining to limit § 
7212(a).157  The Tenth Circuit in Sorensen acknowledged that DOJ had a 
 
 150. See Kassouf, 144 F.3d at 958.   
 151. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee James J. Kassouf at 19, Kassouf, 144 F.3d at 955 (No. 1:95-
CR-199), 1996 WL 34386659, at *17; Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 6-8, Kassouf, 144 F.3d at 955 
(No. 1:95-CR-199), (May 12, 1997), 1997 WL 34609476, at *7. 
 152. Brief of Defendant-Appellee James J. Kassouf at 19, Kassouf, 144 F.3d at 955 (No. 1:95-CR-
199), 1996 WL 34386659, at *17. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 6-8, Kassouf, 144 F.3d at 955 (No. 1:95-CR-199), (May 
12, 1997), 1997 WL 34609476, at *7. 
 155. Kassouf, 144 F.3d at 958. 
 156. See Sorensen, 801 F.3d at 1226-27 (citing Abramski v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2259, 2274 
(2014) and United States v. Apel, 134 S.Ct. 1144, 1151 (2014)) (“[W]e have never held that the 
Government’s reading of a criminal statute is entitled to any deference.”). 
 157. See id.; United States v. Marinello (“Marinello I”), 839 F.3d 209, 222 (2d Cir. 2016), rev’d 
and remanded, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018). 
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policy limiting the conduct that DOJ would prosecute under § 7212(a).158  
The court explained that DOJ policy instructed that  
§ 7212(a) “should not be used as a substitute for a charge directly related 
to tax liability—such as tax evasion or filing a false tax return—if such a 
charge is readily provable.”159  The court noted that it was up to DOJ, not 
the court, to determine how to enforce that policy, and declined to second-
guess the government’s view whether § 7201 was “readily provable” in 
that case.160  The court did note that DOJ’s failure to comply with its own 
policy did not confer any substantive rights on the defendant.161  Although 
the court cited the policy, it gave no indication that it was aware what 
impact that policy had in selecting the cases that comprise the corpus of 
§ 7212(a) jurisprudence. 
In a striking display of deference to the Executive Branch, the Second 
Circuit in Marinello I seemed to rely heavily on DOJ guidance when 
declining to limit § 7212(a).  In Marinello I, the Second Circuit upheld 
the defendant’s conviction under § 7212(a) in part because the charges 
were brought consistent with DOJ policy.162  In concluding that the 
omnibus clause of § 7212(a) criminalizes any corrupt interference with 
IRS agents administering any aspect of the tax code, the court reasoned, 
in part, that this interpretation was consistent with internal Tax Division 
policy stating that the omnibus clause may be charged prior to any audit 
or investigation if the conduct is large-scale obstructive conduct and 
involves the tax liability of third parties.163    
The Marinello I court’s deference to the executive branch to determine 
the scope of § 7212(a) was highly unusual and somewhat alarming.  The 
dissent from denial of en banc review in the Second Circuit even curtly 
noted, “unlike the panel, I decline to defer to the Department of Justice’s 
views to determine the scope of a criminal statute.”164  After all, it is the 
job of the Judiciary, not the Executive, to say what the law means.165     
 
 158. Sorensen, 801 F.3d at 1226-27. 
 159. Id. at 1227. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See Marinello I, 839 F.3d at 222. 
 163. Id. at 222-23.  It should be noted that the court in Marinello I read DOJ policy as far more 
expansive than the author of this article, who considers the charges in Marinello I to be outside the scope 
of DOJ policy guidance.  
 164. United States v. Marinello (“Marinello II”), 855 F.3d 455 (2d. Cir. 2017) (Jacobs, J., dissenting 
from denial of en banc review). 
 165. See United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S.Ct. 1163 (2016) (citing Abramski v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 2259, 2274 (2014) and United States v. 
Apel, 134 S.Ct. 1144, 1151 (2014)) (“[W]e have never held that the Government’s reading of a criminal 
statute is entitled to any deference.”). The Second Circuit’s partial reliance on DOJ guidance about when 
to prosecute a statute is indeed troubling. It is the job of the judiciary to say what the law is and the job of 
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These examples represent three of the six circuits weighing in on the 
issue whether § 7212(a) has a “pending IRS action” requirement.  The 
Sorensen opinion, which discussed DOJ policy at some length, was cited 
by the court in Westbrooks, which means that the Fifth Circuit was clearly 
aware of the DOJ policy as well.166  Thus, there is evidence that at the 
very least four of the six circuits deciding this issue were aware that since 
1989, DOJ has had limiting policies in place curtailing use of the statute, 
but there is little evidence these courts appreciated the impact that such 
limiting policy could have on the development of judicial limits on § 
7212(a). 
B. DOJ Policy Has Limited § 7212(a) Cases to Cases Where There 
Was A Pending IRS Action or the Defendant Knew His Conduct 
Would Cause the IRS to Initiate an Action 
DOJ policy limiting § 7212(a) prosecutions has curated the cases that 
reached judicial review, ensuring that for cases charged under the 
omnibus provision, the defendant’s conduct was, at least most of the time, 
obstructive of a particular IRS agent or proceeding.  By limiting the cases 
that have undergone scrutiny by a court in § 7212(a) cases, DOJ chose its 
hand carefully so that even when courts were confronted with cases that 
stretched the boundaries of § 7212(a), the conduct impacted or caused an 
IRS proceeding and thus fit within even a narrow reading of § 7212(a).   
1. The Bailiwick of § 7212(a) Cases is Tax Protestors: Individuals 
Who Obstinately Refuse to Pay Their Taxes and Do Everything 
Possible to Make the IRS’s Job Harder 
The omnibus clause of § 7212(a) has traditionally been used in the 
context of the “tax protestor,” the individual who has made it his mission 
to thwart the IRS’s ability to collect his taxes.  Tax protestors engage in 
myriad tactics to prevent the IRS from collecting taxes, from sending 
multitudinous frivolous correspondence to the IRS, filing false tax 
returns, filing liens and court actions to harass IRS agents, and just 
generally being a pain in the IRS’s neck.167  The omnibus clause therefore 
 
the executive to enforce that law.  If courts began routinely referring to DOJ policy to support judicial 
decisions about the scope of criminal statutes, every court opinion deciding the scope of a criminal statute 
would involve circular logic: the government charged the statute in a particular way, and since we defer 
to the government’s view of the scope of the statute, they must have charged it correctly.  In essence, no 
criminal appeal challenging the scope of a statute would ever succeed as long as DOJ followed its own 
internal policy. 
 166. See United States v. Westbrooks, 858 F.3d 317, 323 (5th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded, 138 
S.Ct. 1101 (2018). 
 167. For a discussion of tax protestor schemes and tactics, see Dep’t of Just., Crim. Tax Manual, 
40.00 Tax Defiers (also known as illegal tax protestors), at 1-17 (2012), available at 
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seems a particularly appropriate charge for the tax protestor—pretty much 
every action he engages in is intended to interfere with a pending IRS 
action or to fraudulently cause the IRS to initiate an action. 
In many cases involving tax protestors, there was no question that the 
defendant intended to obstruct a known, pending IRS proceeding, even if 
the government failed to allege that there was such proceeding.  These 
prosecutions were authorized consistent with DOJ guidance to use  
§ 7212(a) for cases where a defendant obstructs an active investigation or 
audit.  For example, in Massey, the defendant did not file tax returns for 
six tax years, and when the IRS contacted him, he threatened to sue the 
IRS and its agents, told IRS that he would charge them $500,000 for 
unauthorized use of his name, and demanded IRS stop the 
investigation.168  While the government did not allege that there was a 
pending IRS action, the proof at trial demonstrated that the defendant was 
aware that the IRS had initiated collection efforts.169  In other words, the 
defendant harassed the IRS during ongoing IRS collection efforts that he 
clearly knew about.170 
In Miner, in which the government likewise did not allege that there 
was a pending IRS action, the defendant’s conduct perpetuating two 
large-scale tax protestor schemes was so clearly obstructive of a pending 
IRS proceeding that the Sixth Circuit upheld the defendant’s conviction 
even though the court simultaneously limited the scope of § 7212(a).171  
Although the court held that § 7212(a) did indeed require the government 
to prove that the defendant was aware of a pending IRS action or 
proceeding at the time he engaged in corrupt conduct, the court held that 
there was ample evidence that the defendant was aware of a pending IRS 
proceeding when he attempted to obstruct the IRS.172   
Some courts faced with tax protestor defendants, when the government 
failed to allege that the defendant was aware of a pending IRS proceeding, 
have held that § 7212(a) reaches conduct that the defendant knows would 
cause the IRS to initiate a proceeding.  The best example of a court 
upholding a tax protestor’s conviction under § 7212(a) although the 
government failed to allege that there was a pending IRS proceeding—in 
the face of conflicting, binding authority, no less—is found in the Sixth 
Circuit opinion in Bowman.173  Bowman was a tax protestor who had 
 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tax/legacy/2012/12/05/CTM%20Chapter%2040.pdf. 
 168. United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.  
 171. See United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 346 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 172. Id. at 346. 
 173. See United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 1999). 
27
Booth: Prosecutorial Discretion in Criminal Tax Obstruction Cases: How D
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
1152 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 86 
gotten himself deep in debt, harassed his creditors with bogus lawsuits, 
and filed fake Forms 1099 with the IRS to cause the IRS to issue false 
notices of tax delinquency to his creditors.174  The scheme arguably fit 
DOJ policy because it was fairly expansive (it involved numerous 
individuals and businesses), and it involved the tax liabilities of numerous 
third parties (although Bowman was not technically trying to help them 
avoid their tax liability—which seems to be the spirit of Tax Division 
Directive 129—but to create tax liability where there was none).  But 
regardless whether this prosecution was entirely consistent with Tax 
Division guidance on how to charge § 7212(a), this case represents a 
situation where the defendant engaged in behavior that was clearly 
intended fraudulently to cause the IRS to initiate actions against 
Bowman’s creditors.   
In holding that § 7212(a) did not contain a pending IRS action 
requirement, the court seemed particularly concerned that prosecutors 
should be able to convict tax protestor defendants, whose mission was to 
annoy and harass the IRS, of obstruction under § 7212(a).  The court 
explained that “unless Kassouf is limited to its facts, its effect would be 
to prevent the prosecution of actions whole sole purpose is to obstruct or 
impede the IRS in the administration of its duties, as those acts of 
obstruction only trigger or attempt to trigger investigation by the IRS.”175  
The court was understandably consternated that Kassouf would prevent a 
conviction in Bowman’s case, where the defendant clearly intended to 
cause the IRS to initiate frivolous proceedings, wasting IRS resources and 
taxpayer money.    
Similarly, the court in United States v. Molesworth held that a tax 
protestor who intended to fraudulently cause the IRS to initiate an action 
violated § 7212(a).  The defendant in Molesworth was a tax protestor who 
hoped to harass his creditors by filing false forms with the IRS that 
claimed his creditors had $24 million in unreported income. 176  This 
scheme, which was apparently a once-popular method for tax protestors 
to vent their angst against their creditors and the IRS, also caused the IRS 
to spend time and resources to determine that the forms were 
fraudulent.177  The court held, consistent with Bowman, that because the 
defendant engaged in conduct designed to cause the IRS to initiate an 
action, his conduct was covered by § 7212(a).178  In each case, the court 
held that § 7212(a) extended to cover the tax protestor’s conduct, which 
 
 174. See Bowman, 173 F.3d at 596-97. 
 175. Id. at 600. 
 176. See Government’s Trial Brief, United States v. Molesworth, No. 05-045-C-EJL, 2005 WL 
5840367, at 1 (D. Idaho, August 26, 2005). 
 177. Id.  
 178. United States v. Molesworth, 383 F. Supp.2d 1251, 1253-54 (D. Idaho 2005). 
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was clearly intended to cause the IRS to initiate an action, 
notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was not aware of a pending 
IRS proceeding at the time.179 
2. DOJ Policy Limiting § 7212(a) Charges to Large-Scale Cases 
Obstructing the Tax Liability of Third Parties Produces Cases 
Where the Defendant Knew His Conduct Would Cause the IRS to 
Initiate Proceedings 
In addition to authorizing cases when a defendant obstructed a known 
IRS proceeding, DOJ policy permits § 7212(a) charges when a 
defendant’s conduct is large in scale and obstructs the tax liability of third 
parties.  Several defendants who have challenged the government’s 
failure to allege a pending IRS action under § 7212(a) have been tax 
protestors who promoted large-scale scams to help third parties avoid 
paying taxes.180  These cases were consistent with DOJ policy about when 
to authorize § 7212(a) charges.  For example, in United States v. Crim, 
the defendant promoted two large-scale tax scams, both foreign and 
domestic, to help third parties evade their taxes.181  The court held that 
helping others conceal their money from the IRS was sufficient to obstruct 
the due administration of the Internal Revenue Code.182   
Similarly, the charged conduct in Floyd involved operating two 
elaborate, large-scale, tax protestor scams to help third parties avoid 
paying the IRS.183  The first scam involved allowing clients, who were 
employers, to pay funds to a nominee company to allow the employers to 
avoid paying the required withholding taxes.184  The second scam 
involved comingled funds of multiple clients into nominee “warehouse 
bank” accounts, thereby disguising the funds from the IRS.185  This 
conduct was consistent with Tax Division guidance about when to charge 
§ 7212(a) because both scams were large in scale and affected the tax 
liability of third parties.  Additionally, the defendants’ conduct was 
clearly specifically intended to obstruct the IRS’s ability to assess and 
collect taxes; there was no question that the IRS would initiate 
 
 179. See United States v. Crim, No. 06-CR-00658-2, 2007 WL 4563481, *2 (E.D. Pa., December 
13, 2007); Molesworth, 383 F. Supp.2d at 1253-54. 
 180. See Crim, No. 06-CR-00658-2, 2007 WL 4563481; Molesworth, 383 F. Supp.2d 1251; United 
States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 344-45 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 181. See Superseding Indictment at 1-4, United States v. Crim, No.06-CR-00658, 2007 WL 
3299068, at *1-2. (E.D. Pa. April 24, 2007). 
 182. Crim, 2007 WL 4563481, at *2. 
 183. United States v. Floyd, 740 F.3d 22, 32 n.4 (1st Cir. 2014).   
 184. Id. at 27. 
 185. Id. 
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proceedings based on the sheer number of fraudulent transactions.  The 
court held that the totality of the evidence demonstrated that the 
defendants corruptly endeavored to impede the IRS’s assessment of their 
taxes.186 
Not all defendants charged under § 7212(a) are tax protestors.  
However, in non-tax protestor cases, DOJ policy limiting the use of  
§ 7212(a) has ensured that there are some additional indicia of intent to 
upset the IRS’s internal procedures beyond the garden variety tax case.  
For example, the defendant in Wood was a seasoned attorney with 
experience in criminal tax law, which indicates that he knew what impact 
his conduct would have on the IRS.187  The defendant was charged under 
§ 7212(a) when he not only refused to pay his own taxes, but had 
previously represented clients facing criminal tax charges, and took $11 
million income he and his cohorts swindled from investors in a Ponzi 
scheme and hid it from the IRS in the offshore and nominee bank 
accounts.188  Further, though this defendant was not identified as a tax 
protestor, he claimed that his “religious beliefs” prevented him from 
paying taxes, which is the sort of tax-thwarting mindset common to tax 
protestors.189   
The charges in Wood fall squarely within Tax Division guidance about 
when to charge a § 7212(a) prosecution “prior to any audit or 
investigation” because the conduct was large in scale and involved the tax 
liabilities of third parties.190  Moreover, the defendant was an attorney 
with specific knowledge about his duties to comply with the tax laws.191  
The court found that the “natural and probable effect” of his conduct was 
to obstruct or impede the IRS, notwithstanding the fact that the 
government failed to prove any pending IRS action or proceeding.192 
Similarly, in United States v. Willner, the defendant charged with  
§ 7212(a) was an IRS employee; clearly this defendant should have 
known the impact his actions would have on pending or future IRS 
actions.193  The defendant used his advertising agency to conceal from the 
IRS his income from teaching business courses at graduate schools in 
Manhattan.194  The defendant invited others to participate in his scheme 
to conceal income from the IRS, and took a 20% fee for concealing their 
 
 186. Id.  
 187. See United States v. Wood, 384 Fed. App’x 698, 700 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 188. See id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. See United States v. Wood, 384 Fed. App’x 698, 705-06 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 193. United States v. Willner, No. 07 Cr. 183, 2007 WL 2963711, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007). 
 194. Id. at *1. 
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income through the advertising agency.195  Although it did not deal with 
a tax protestor, this case fits within Tax Division policy because it was 
large scale and involved the tax liability of third parties.  Further, the 
defendant’s intent seemed particularly culpable because Willner was an 
IRS employee who certainly should have known better.196  
Likewise, the defendant in Westbrooks was a tax return preparer who 
engaged in a large-scale scheme to thwart the tax liability of multiple third 
parties.197  Westbrooks filed false tax returns which underreported the 
income she paid to the employees of her tax return preparation business 
and failed to properly file IRS forms documenting cash payments she 
made to employees.198  Additionally, the IRS executed a search warrant 
on her business and served her with a grand jury subpoena to provide 
business records.199  Westbrooks was later held in criminal contempt for 
failing to comply with the subpoena.200  The court held that § 7212(a) did 
not require the government to allege a pending IRS proceeding.201  
Similarly, the court held that Westbrooks’ vagueness and overbreadth 
challenge failed because her conduct was prohibited by the statute.202  
While the court reached both these conclusions based on the 
government’s allegations that Westbrooks engaged in deceptive practices 
like making cash payments and not filing required documents with the 
IRS, it cannot be ignored that Westbrooks also interfered with an ongoing 
IRS criminal proceeding.203  This case appears to be well within DOJ 
guidelines.  
Most cases in which a defendant has challenged his § 7212(a) 
conviction based on the absence of a then-pending IRS action are 
consistent with DOJ’s internal policy limiting § 7212(a) prosecutions to 
cases “prior to any audit or investigation” to those cases involving “large-
scale obstructive conduct involving the tax liability of third parties.”   
Large-scale conduct affecting the tax liability of third parties tends to 
impact pending IRS proceedings or to cause the IRS to initiate 
proceedings.  That is, in most of these cases, the defendant’s intent to 
interfere with a pending IRS action or to fraudulently cause the IRS to 
initiate an action is clear. 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. United States v. Westbrooks, 858 F.3d 317, 322-23 (5th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded, 138 
S.Ct. 1101 (2018). 
 198. Id. at 321. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 324. 
 202. Id. at 325. 
 203. Id. at 325. 
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C. DOJ Policy Has Ensured That Challenges to § 7212(a) on Grounds 
of Overbreadth and Vagueness Have Failed 
Several courts have considered whether § 7212(a) would be vague or 
overbroad if not limited to conduct occurring in response to a concurrently 
pending IRS action.204  The Tenth, Second, and Fifth circuits have 
rejected such vagueness and overbreadth challenges, while the Sixth 
noted that the statute would be ripe for vagueness and overbreadth 
challenges if § 7212(a) were not limited to conduct occurring in response 
to pending IRS actions.205  
DOJ policy limiting the scope of § 7212(a) to cases that did, in many 
cases, involve a pending IRS proceeding, has ensured that the statute has 
never been held unconstitutionally vague or overbroad based on the fact 
that it does not require a pending IRS action.  A criminal statute is 
unconstitutionally vague if it fails to “define the criminal offense with 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct 
is prohibited” or if it does not establish guidelines to prevent “arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement of the law.”206  A defendant’s claim that 
a criminal statute is vague “will fail if a reasonable person would have 
known from the language of the statute that his specific alleged conduct 
was at risk.”207  Because vagueness and overbreadth challenges are 
 
 204. See United States v. Westbrooks, 858 F.3d 317, 322-23 (5th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded, 
138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018) (rejecting challenge to § 7212(a) on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth based 
on the defendant’s conduct); United States v. Marinello, 839 F.3d 209, 221-22 (2d. Cir. 2016), rev’d and 
remanded, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018) (rejecting challenge to § 7212(a) on grounds of vagueness and 
overbreadth because previous courts had rejected similar challenges and restricted the term “corruptly” to 
render the statute constitutional); United States v. Wood, 384 Fed. App’x 698, 706 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that § 7212(a) was not vague or overbroad as applied to the defendant’s conduct).  
 205. See Westbrooks, 858 F.3d at 322-23; Marinello, 839 F.3d at 221-22; Wood, 384 Fed. App’x at 
706; United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 958 (6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that if § 7212(a) is not 
limited to pending IRS actions, the statute would be open to “legitimate charges of overbreadth and 
vagueness”); see also United States v. Miner, 744 F.3d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 2014) (reaffirming Kassouf on 
this point).  
  The majority of Courts of Appeals decisions that have rejected challenges to § 7212(a)’s 
vagueness and overbreadth have not considered whether the statute should have a pending IRS 
requirement; most vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the statute have concerned the proper scope 
of the term “corruptly.” See United States v. Ring, 191 F.3d 442 (9th Cir., Sept. 8, 1999) (unpublished) 
(rejecting challenge to § 7212(a) on grounds of vagueness and overbreadth); United States v. Kelly, 147 
F.3d 172, 176 (2d. Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Popkin, 943 F.2d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 999 (5th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 
474, 479 (4th Cir. 1995) (adopting same definition of “corruptly” as Reeves and upholding conviction 
under § 7212(a) when defendant corruptly interfered with IRS auction of his property); United States v. 
Yagow, 953 F.2d 423, 427 (8th Cir. 1992) (adopting Reeves’s definition of “corruptly” and upholding § 
7212(a) conviction when defendant tax protestor sent tax “bills” to various individuals and also filed those 
forms with the IRS). 
 206. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64-65 (1999) (O’Connor, J., concurring); United 
States v. Westbrooks, 858 F.3d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018). 
 207. Brennick, 908 F. Supp. at 1010; see Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988); United 
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limited to the facts of the case at hand, if a defendant’s conduct as charged 
is clearly prohibited by a statute, a vagueness or overbreadth challenge 
can never prevail.208  Thus, when DOJ policy has limited prosecutions 
under § 7212(a)’s omnibus clause as described above, such conduct 
typically fell under even a narrow reading of the statute.  
The court’s rejection of the defendant’s vagueness and overbreadth 
challenge in Westbrooks highlights the role that DOJ policy limiting the 
statute has played in courts rejecting similar challenges.  The defendant 
in Westbrooks was a tax return preparer who was convicted of § 7212(a) 
for filing false tax returns for her employees, failing to properly file forms 
with the IRS, and providing false and misleading testimony at a show 
cause hearing in response to a grand jury subpoena in a criminal IRS 
investigation.209  Westbrooks argued on appeal that unless § 7212(a) 
required a pending IRS action, it was unconstitutionally vague.210  The 
court explained in dicta that the requirement that the conduct be “corrupt” 
was sufficient to protect the statute from vagueness and overbreadth 
challenges.211  
More importantly, the Court held that Westbrooks could not challenge 
the vagueness of a statute if her conduct was clearly proscribed by the 
statute.212  The court explained that Westbrooks had fabricated 
“compensation amounts on her returns and engaged in deceptive 
practices, such as making cash payments and not filing wage reporting 
documents to conceal the low amounts of compensation the workers 
received.”213  
The court conceded that the mere fact that some conduct clearly falls 
within § 7212(a) does not save the statute; the statute may still be vague 
or overbroad as to some other conduct.  But the court explained that “a 
defendant whose conduct is clearly prohibited cannot be the one making 
that challenge.”214  Although the court in Westbrooks relied in its 
reasoning on the return preparer’s deceptive practices and failure to file 
documents on behalf of her employees, she was also charged with 
providing false documents in response to a grand jury subpoena and 
making misleading statements at a show cause hearing.215  Thus, not only 
 
States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975).  This applies only to vagueness claims the non-First Amendment 
context. See Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361. 
 208. See United States v. Brennick, 908 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (D. Mass. 1995). 
 209. Westbrooks, 858 F.3d at 321-22, rev’d and remanded, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018).  
 210. Id. at 324-25. 
 211. Id. at 325. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id.  
 214. Id. at 325-26.  
 215. Id. at 326, rev’d and remanded, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018). 
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was her conduct “large-scale” and “affecting the tax liability of third 
parties,” it was also obstructive of a pending criminal IRS 
investigation.216  
Westbrooks illustrates how DOJ policy limiting conduct that can be 
charged under § 7212(a) has ensured that any vagueness and overbreadth 
challenge to the statute would fail.  Westbrooks’ vagueness and 
overbreadth challenge failed because her conduct was prohibited by § 
7212(a).  While the court did not focus on her conduct failing to comply 
with a subpoena to produce records during the course of an ongoing 
investigation, that conduct surely helped support the court’s conclusion 
that Westbrooks’ actions amounted to criminal obstruction. Because DOJ 
limited prosecutions to those impacting a pending audit or proceeding or 
those that are large in scale and affecting the tax liabilities of third parties, 
Westbrooks’ conduct fell under these strictures, her conduct naturally also 
violated a narrow reading of § 7212(a).  
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit in Wood rejected the defendants’ claims 
that the statute was overbroad because the sine qua non of the defendant’s 
specific conduct in that case fell squarely within the statute’s ambit.217  
The court explained that the defendant’s actions using “deceptive 
techniques including using domestic non-interest-bearing bank accounts 
under his signature, offshore credit card accounts, and nominee entities to 
hide income and assets from the IRS” fell under § 7212(a).218  These 
actions are punishable under DOJ guidance about when to charge § 
7212(a) because the defendant’s actions were large in scale and affected 
the tax liability of third parties.  Further, the defendant had an increased 
level of knowledge about when and what would trigger an IRS proceeding 
as an attorney, which makes it more likely that an IRS proceeding was 
“reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant. In this case, the prosecution 
under § 7212(a) was consistent with DOJ guidance and was based on 
conduct the defendant could not have realistically thought was legal.  It is 
unlikely a court would find a defendant who engaged in egregiously 
corrupt conduct such as this was not on fair notice about what conduct 
was prohibited.219 
In holding that § 7212(a) was not unconstitutionally overbroad or 
vague, both the Tenth and the Fifth Circuits examined conduct that was 
clearly unlawful.  However, examining what conduct could fall under the 
broadest reading of § 7212(a) demonstrates that the statute could easily 
 
 216. Id. at 321. 
 217. United States v. Wood, 384 Fed. App’x 698, 706 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See Westbrooks, 585 F.3d at 325 (5th Cir. 2017), rev’d and remanded, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018) 
(stating that to prevail on a claim that § 7212(a) is unconstitutionally vague, defendant must show that a 
person of ordinary intelligence is not on fair notice of what is prohibited.). 
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ensnare some otherwise lawful conduct.  In Kassouf, the Sixth Circuit 
expressed concerns that a broad reading of § 7212(a) would open the 
statute to “legitimate charges of overbreadth and vagueness, particularly 
where the statute may pose liability for otherwise lawful conduct.”220  The 
court reasoned “out of the hundreds of people who file taxes every day, 
there is no guarantee that a particular tax return will be audited. Therefore, 
it would be highly speculative to find conduct such as the destruction of 
records, which might or might not be needed, in an audit which might or 
might not ever occur, is sufficient to make out an omnibus clause 
violation.”221  The court ultimately rejected the defendant’s argument that 
§ 7212(a) was unconstitutionally vague, overbroad, and ambiguous on the 
grounds that such concerns were unfounded after the court had limited the 
statute to conduct occurring after an IRS proceeding was initiated.222 
In her dissent in Kassouf, Judge Daughtrey averred that such concerns 
were unfounded because § 7212(a) still required such conduct to be done 
“corruptly.”223  In her view, the requirement that conduct must also be 
“corrupt” was “comforting” and, if properly enforced by the courts, would 
not permit prosecutions of otherwise lawful conduct.224  But the Supreme 
Court in Marinello III emphatically disagreed with the government’s 
argument that the term “corruptly” saved the statute from overbreadth.225  
The government argued that § 7212(a) would not encompass 
misdemeanor tax violations, such as failure to file a tax return under § 
7203, because § 7203 requires the government to prove that the conduct 
was “willful” while § 7212(a) required the government to prove that the 
conduct was “corrupt.”226  The Court rejected this proposition, explaining 
that “we struggle to imagine a scenario where a taxpayer would ‘willfully’ 
violate the Tax Code . . . without intending someone to obtain an unlawful 
advantage [which is the requirement to prove ‘corrupt’ conduct].”227  
Thus, the Court agreed with Kassouf’s concern that, unless § 7212(a) was 
limited to pending IRS proceedings, the statute may be vague and 
overbroad as to some conduct.  
Any time a defendant’s conduct was clearly intended to be obstructive 
to the functions of the IRS, a court considering a vagueness or overbreadth 
challenge to § 7212(a) will necessarily reject such challenge because the 
 
 220. Kassouf v. United States, 144 F.3d 952, 958 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 960 (Daughtrey, J., concurring and dissenting).  
 224. Id. 
 225. Marinello v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018).  
 226. See id.  
 227. Id.  
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defendant cannot complain that such malicious and nefarious actions 
were in some way immune from prosecution.228  It is only when faced 
with cases that do not involve prototypically obstructive conduct that a 
court would entertain such a challenge.229  Because DOJ policy has 
limited prosecutions under § 7212(a) to those that occur after an audit or 
investigation, or in the case of large-scale attempts to evade the tax 
liabilities of third parties, such policy has likewise ensured that non-
prototypical obstructive acts are not charged and therefore never reach the 
courts. 
IV. SECTION 7212(A) PROSECUTIONS IN THE WAKE OF MARINELLO: NOT 
MUCH WILL CHANGE 
Despite the fact that it abrogates the binding decisions in a majority of 
circuits considering the scope of § 7212(a), Supreme Court’s new 
guidance in Marinello III is unlikely to dramatically expand or contract 
the compendium of cases DOJ already prosecutes under § 7212(a).  First, 
DOJ policy has typically resulted in prosecutions where either there was, 
in fact, a pending IRS proceeding, or else such proceeding was reasonably 
foreseeable to the defendant.  Second, when DOJ has not alleged a 
pending IRS proceeding, the defendant’s conduct was typically extensive 
and egregious, which means the § 7212(a) count was not the only criminal 
conduct for which he is liable.  As a result, the obstruction count does not 
change the punishment he would receive.  Finally, nothing in Marinello 
III is likely to cause the IRS to alter its usual procedures about when to 
open an investigation or how soon to notify a taxpayer that an IRS 
proceeding is underway.   
A. DOJ Charging Policy Has Usually Restricted § 7212(a) 
Prosecutions to Those in Which the Defendant Obstructed a 
Pending Audit or Investigation 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Marinello III imposes slightly 
different limitations on § 7212(a) than DOJ guidance, because the Court 
explained that to prove a violation of § 7212(a), the government must 
show that (1) there was a “nexus” between the defendant’s conduct and 
the administrative proceeding at issue, and (2) the proceeding was either 
pending at the time or was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.  Thus, 
 
 228. See United States v. Brennick, 908 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (D. Mass 1995). 
 229. Cf. United States v. Reeves, 752 F.2d 995, 1003 (5th Cir. 1985) (Williams, J., dissenting) (“The 
conclusion that a statute is too vague and therefore void as a matter of due process is thus unlikely to be 
triggered without two findings: that the individual challenging the statute is indeed one of the entrapped 
innocent, and that it would have been practical for the legislature to draft more precisely.”) (quoting 
Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 718). 
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the Supreme Court’s guidance adds a “nexus” requirement that is not 
found in the Tax Division policy statements limiting § 7212(a).  The 
Supreme Court’s decision in Marinello III is also slightly more 
encompassing than DOJ guidance; the Court explained that the 
proceeding need not actually be pending, as DOJ policy states, but that  
§ 7212(a) charges may be initiated if the IRS proceeding was “reasonably 
foreseeable” to the defendant.  
In any event, the Supreme Court’s opinion is unlikely to affect how § 
7212(a) is charged.  First, whether there was a “nexus” between the 
defendant’s conduct and a pending IRS proceeding can likely be 
established by the same proof that there was a pending IRS proceeding at 
the time the defendant engaged in obstructive conduct, which is what DOJ 
has traditionally alleged anyway.   
Next, when DOJ prosecutes § 7212(a) in the absence of a pending IRS 
proceeding, DOJ typically restricts its obstruction prosecutions to “large 
scale” conduct “affecting the tax liability of third parties.”  These 
requirements typically mean that the defendant is subject to additional 
felony tax crimes that result in a substantially similar punishment whether 
§ 7212(a) is charged or not.  
1. The Nexus Requirement Will Be Easy to Establish If the 
Government Alleges That There Was a Pending IRS Action 
Most of the time DOJ has charged § 7212(a), the government has 
alleged that the defendant obstructed a pending audit or investigation.  In 
cases where there was no concurrently pending IRS audit or investigation, 
DOJ guidance suggests that § 7212(a) is appropriate in cases where the 
taxpayer’s conduct was large in scale and affected the tax liability of third 
parties.230  Although this article has focused on the cases in which the 
government did not make such an allegation, there are numerous 
examples of when § 7212(a) has been used, consistent with DOJ 
guidance, to punish conduct related to a pending proceeding.231  For 
example, in United States v. Kelly, the defendant was convicted of a 
violation of § 7212(a) for providing false information to an IRS employee 
 
 230. Dep’t of Just., Crim. Tax Manual, 3.00 Tax Div. Pol’y Directives & Memoranda, 49 (2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tax/legacy/2014/08/05/CTM%20Chapter%203.pdf#Directive
%20No.%20129 (emphasis added). 
 231. See generally, 26 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 229 (Originally published in 2008) (“One area of conduct to 
which said statute has applied is providing false documents or information. In that regard, courts have 
upheld convictions of defendants under said statute who have filed false tax returns or IRS forms . . . or 
provided other false income-related information . . . filed false complaints, liens, or other false legal 
documents . . . and presented warrants or other false financial instruments . . . .”).  
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during an audit.232  In United States v. Bostian, the defendant was 
convicted of § 7212(a) when he recorded fraudulent lis pendens on 
property the IRS was attempting to sell auction to satisfy his tax debts, in 
an effort to thwart the IRS’s active and ongoing collection efforts.233  In 
United States v. McBride, the defendant was convicted of  
§ 7212(a) for filing a fraudulent petition to place an IRS agent in 
involuntary bankruptcy when the defendant knew the IRS agent was 
attempting to collect taxes from the defendant’s girlfriend, who had been 
convicted of tax evasion.234  These examples are straightforward 
illustrations of how § 7212(a) is typically used by DOJ, to punish corrupt 
obstructive conduct aimed at a known pending IRS proceeding or a 
specific IRS agent.   
The Supreme Court’s “nexus” requirement will likely not change much 
for cases in which the government was already alleging that the defendant 
obstructed a pending IRS proceeding.  Certainly, the “nexus” requirement 
imposes a new evidentiary bar for the government to hurdle.  Section 
7212(a) jury instructions will hereafter need to explain that not only was 
there a pending or foreseeable IRS proceeding, but that there was a 
“nexus” between the defendant’s conduct and the proceeding.  However, 
when the defendant’s obstructive conduct was directed a pending IRS 
proceeding, proof of the “nexus” will typically be established through 
proof of the conduct itself.   
For example, in Miner, the defendant was charged with one count of 
obstruction under § 7212(a) and two counts of failing to file tax returns in 
violation of § 7203 (misdemeanor violations) for his conduct promoting 
two tax protestor schemes to help clients illegally avoid paying taxes.235  
Under the first scheme, the defendant told prospective clients that the IRS 
was conducting a huge fraud and that he could help write letters and file 
documents with the IRS in exchange for a $1,800 annual fee.236  Under 
the second scheme, the defendant helped clients conceal from the IRS 
funds that he funneled through business trust accounts.237  At the end of 
trial, the defendant requested a jury instruction that he could only be 
convicted under § 7212(a) if he was aware of a pending IRS proceeding 
at the time he took his allegedly criminal actions.  The district court 
denied the motion.238  The Sixth Circuit held that the defendant’s conduct 
was insufficient to support a violation of § 7212(a), because “a defendant 
 
 232. United States v. Kelly, 147 F.3d 172, 176 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 233. United States v. Bostian, 59 F.3d 474, 479 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 234. United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 372 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 235. United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 339 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 342. 
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may not be convicted under the omnibus clause unless he is ‘acting in 
response to some pending IRS action of which he is aware.’”239 
Although the Sixth Circuit held in Miner that the district court erred in 
failing to give the defendant’s proposed jury instruction, the court upheld 
the conviction.240  The court concluded that the district court’s error was 
harmless because there was “ample evidence that Miner was aware of one 
or more pending IRS proceedings when he corruptly attempted to obstruct 
the IRS’s administration of the tax laws . . . .”241  This same evidence that 
Miner was aware of multiple pending IRS proceedings and that he 
fraudulently wrote letters and filing documents with the IRS, in light of 
those pending proceedings, seems sufficient to satisfy the “nexus” 
requirement in Marinello III.242  
Similarly, in Massey (in which the Ninth Circuit upheld a defendant’s 
conviction under § 7212(a)), although the government failed to allege that 
there was a pending IRS proceeding, the evidence at trial clearly 
established that the defendant was aware of multiple pending IRS 
proceedings.  In Massey, the defendant did not file tax returns for several 
years.243  When the IRS contacted him about his failure to file, he 
threatened to sue the IRS and its agents, and told them that if they did not 
leave him alone he would assess them with a $500,000 penalty for 
“unauthorized” use of his name.244  The defendant was convicted of one 
count of § 7212(a) and three misdemeanor counts of failure to file under 
§ 7203.245   
While the Ninth Circuit spared few words on the issue,246 the context 
of the case as described in the parties’ briefs hints at why the court may 
have ruled the way it did.  The evidence at trial clearly proved that the 
IRS had initiated collection efforts at the time the defendant engaged in 
his corrupt conduct.247  That is, the evidence did show that the defendant 
was aware of a pending IRS action when he engaged in obstructive 
conduct.  The IRS notified the defendant multiple times by letter and over 
 
 239. Id. at 342, 345.  
 240. Id. at 346. 
 241. United States v. Miner, 774 F.3d 336, 346 (6th Cir. 2014).  
 242. See Marinello v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018).  
 243. United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir. 2005) 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. (citing Kuball, 976 F.2d at 531). The court simply stated that “[t]he law of this circuit 
establishes that the government need not prove that the defendant was aware of an ongoing tax 
investigation to obtain a conviction under 7212(a); it is sufficient that the defendant hoped ‘to benefit 
financially’ from threatening letters or other conduct. Id. at 1010. 
 247. See Brief for the Appellee at 4-6, United States v. Massey, 419 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 
03-30434), 2004 WL 2085155, at *4-6. 
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the telephone that he was the subject of a civil IRS investigation; when he 
did not stop his behavior, the IRS notified him that he was the subject of 
a criminal investigation.248  The defendant sent numerous letters to the 
IRS and the United States Attorney’s Office demanding, among other 
things, that they cease the investigations.249  Thus, although the case was 
not charged consistently with Marinello because the government failed 
to allege that the defendant knew there was a pending IRS proceeding or 
that there was a nexus between the defendant’s conduct and that 
proceeding, there is no question that the “pending IRS proceeding” and 
“nexus” requirements were met.    
2. The IRS Proceeding Must Be Pending, Or At Least Foreseeable to 
the Defendant 
While the new “nexus” requirement appears to impose a stricter 
limitation on § 7212(a) than traditional DOJ policy guidance, the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Marinello III also expands DOJ policy about when to 
charge § 7212(a), because the Court added that the proceeding need not 
actually be “pending,” but that § 7212(a) charges are appropriate if the 
proceeding was “reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant.250  The Court 
did not elaborate what it meant by a proceeding that is “reasonably 
foreseeable” to a defendant. With little guidance from the Supreme Court, 
one could surmise that conduct designed fraudulently to cause the IRS to 
initiate a proceeding would suffice as a prerequisite to charging § 7212(a).  
The idea that § 7212(a) should reach conduct designed to cause the IRS 
to initiate bogus proceedings—even if the IRS has not yet initiated a 
proceeding—has been articulated in the cases of Bowman251 and 
Molesworth.252  These cases may illuminate what the Supreme Court 
meant when it said § 7212(a) might be appropriate when an IRS 
proceeding was “reasonably foreseeable” to a defendant.  
In Bowman, the court held that a tax protestor’s activities, which were 
designed to induce the IRS to initiate action against his creditors, were 
sufficient to sustain a violation of § 7212(a).253  The defendant in Bowman 
engaged in a string of malfeasance designed to cause the IRS to initiate 
fraudulent proceedings.254  The defendant was a tax protestor who had 
made several bad business decisions that landed him in serious debt.255  
 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. 
 250. Marinello v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101, 1110 (2018).  
 251. 173 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 252. 383 F. Supp.2d 1251 (D. Idaho 2005). 
 253. United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 595, 600 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 254. Id. at 596-97. 
 255. Id. 
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Because of the bad debts, there were several outstanding default 
judgments against the defendant in favor of his creditors.256  In response, 
the defendant sued his creditors, claiming they had violated his civil 
rights.257  He then totaled up the “fines” he asserted he was owed and sent 
each of his creditors a “bill.”258  Then, he purported to “forgive” these 
“debts,” which he asserted had become “income” to his creditors.259  He 
next sent to the IRS several Forms 1099 reflecting this “income.”260  The 
defendant apparently executed this scheme with respect to several 
different creditors.261  In other words, while there was no pending IRS 
proceeding, the defendant was clearly aware that his conduct would cause 
the IRS to initiate proceedings.   
The Sixth Circuit clearly could not fathom how the defendant’s 
conduct, which was designed to cause the IRS to initiate fraudulent 
proceedings, could escape punishment under § 7212(a).  The Bowman 
court did back-flips to avoid applying Kassouf, which was then binding 
law in the Sixth Circuit.262  The court concluded that not only did the 
defendant’s conduct have a “direct impact on the administration of this 
agency’s duties,” but “the obvious purpose of [the defendant’s] actions 
was to harass his creditors.” 263  The court concluded that unless Kassouf 
was limited to its facts, prosecutors could not convict a defendant of  
§ 7212(a) even if he acted with sole purpose of obstructing and impeding 
the IRS prior to any pending IRS action or proceeding.264  The Bowman 
court ultimately held that if a defendant deliberately filed forms with the 
IRS for the purpose of causing the IRS to initiate action against taxpayers, 
it was a violation of § 7212(a) notwithstanding the fact that the defendant 
was not aware of a pending IRS action at the time he filed the forms.265 
Similarly, the defendant in Molesworth was a tax protestor who filed 
false forms with the IRS specifically for the purpose of causing the IRS 
to open proceedings that would assess penalties against his creditors.266  
 
 256. Id. at 597. 
 257. Id. 
 258. United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 595, 597 (6th Cir. 1999).  
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. at 596.  As the court in United States v. Miner so succinctly explained, “After all, Bowman, 
in rejecting Kassouf’s application to a defendant who was attempting to instigate a frivolous IRS 
proceeding rather than to impede a preexisting one, did so primarily because it believed that the indicia 
of intent to impede were patently obvious, even though there was no IRS proceeding pending at the time 
of the defendant’s conduct.”  Miner, 774 F.3d at 344 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 262. Id. at 599-600.   
 263. Id at 600. 
 264. United States v. Bowman, 173 F.3d 595, 600 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 265. Id.  
 266. See Government’s Trial Brief, United States v. Molesworth, No. 05-045-C-EJL, 2005 WL 
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This scheme caused the IRS to spend time and resources to determine that 
the creditors did not, in fact, owe any penalties.267  The court in 
Molesworth followed the Bowman court’s reasoning that § 7212(a) was 
satisfied if the defendant caused the IRS to initiate an action, even if there 
was no pending IRS action at the time he engaged in such conduct.268 
While the Supreme Court in Marinello III did not explicitly 
acknowledge the reasoning underlying the decisions in Bowman or 
Molesworth, one can surmise that these types of situations, if not these 
very cases, were on the Court’s mind when it said that the IRS proceeding 
must “at the least . . . [be] reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.”269  
The Court seemed to be saying that it would be illogical not to extend the 
crime of obstructing the IRS to situations in which the defendant intends 
corruptly to cause the IRS to initiate a specific proceeding.  Based on this 
precedent, it seems likely that Marinello III would permit the government 
to prosecute tax protestor activities under § 7212(a) even if there was no 
concurrent IRS proceeding, so long as the government can prove that the 
defendant intended his conduct to cause the IRS to initiate a specific 
proceeding. 
To take things a step further, Marinello III may even extend to large-
scale conduct which would be likely to cause the IRS to initiate a non-
specific IRS proceeding.  That is, unlike the above cases, where the 
defendants intended the IRS to initiate specific proceedings, if a defendant 
engages in large-scale conduct designed to evade the tax liabilities of 
multiple parties, the sheer number of fraudulent returns or assets hidden 
could arguably make it foreseeable that the IRS would initiate some 
proceeding, such as an audit or a criminal investigation, on at least one of 
his cohorts.  Under Marinello III, conduct that is so beyond the pale that 
it is likely to trigger an IRS investigation or audit likely makes such IRS 
investigation or audit “reasonably foreseeable” to the defendant.   
For example, in Crim,270 the defendants, tax protestors, ran a huge 
scheme through which they encouraged clients to engage in sham 
offshore transactions using a complicated web of trust accounts in order 
to conceal assets from the IRS.271  The defendants were charged with 
obstruction under § 7212(a) for promoting the scam, but the government 
did not allege that there was a pending IRS action at the time they engaged 
in their corrupt conduct.272   
 
5840367, at 1 (D. Idaho, August 26, 2005). 
 267. Id.  
 268. United States v. Molesworth, 383 F. Supp.2d 1251, 1253-54 (D. Idaho 2005). 
 269. Marinello v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101, 1110 (2018).  
 270. 2007 WL 4563481 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2007). 
 271. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Crim, et al., E.D. Pa. No. 06-CR-00658 (April 24, 
2007).  
 272. United States v. Crim, 2007 WL 4563481, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2007) 
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While this conduct really borders on tax evasion, rather than 
obstruction, the defendant’s clear flaunting of the IRS rules seems to push 
this case into obstructive territory.  Tax protestors are typically hyper 
aware that the IRS does not agree with their actions and can be certain 
that the IRS will act to stop such behavior if it is detected.  It is easy to 
fathom how a jury might conclude that the defendants could foresee that 
such conduct would result in the IRS initiating one or more proceedings, 
such as a civil audit or a criminal investigation.  Thus, under Marinello 
III, which permits a prosecution under § 7212(a) not just if there is a 
pending IRS proceeding, but if it is foreseeable that the IRS would initiate 
a proceeding, it is not clear that this conduct would escape punishment, 
even if the defendants did not intend to cause the IRS to initiate any one 
specific proceeding.  This situation also hints at why DOJ has previously 
permitted prosecutions for “large scale conduct” that aids third parties 
evade their taxes.  Tax protestor schemes such as the one described in 
Crim clearly fall under this DOJ guidance, and they also seem to satisfy 
Marinello III’s requirement that the IRS proceeding be pending, “or at 
least, was then reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.”273 
Not all cases involving “large-scale” conduct affecting the tax liability 
of third parties will satisfy the test in Marinello III that an IRS proceeding 
must have been reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.  Most non-tax 
protestor cases involving the large-scale evasion of third-party taxes will 
likely meet the test only if there are some other indicia that the defendant 
intended or knew the IRS would initiate a proceeding based on his 
conduct.  For example, the defendant in Willner was an IRS employee 
who used his advertising agency to conceal his and others’ income from 
the IRS.274  Willner was charged within Tax Division policy of charging 
defendants with § 7212(a) pre-audit in the case of “large-scale” evasion 
of third parties.275  Unlike the tax protestor context, where tax protestors 
set out to cause the IRS to initiate a proceeding, it is not clear that 
Willner’s conduct would cause the IRS to initiate a proceeding, much less 
that a proceeding was foreseeable to him.  Certainly, Willner could have 
foreseen that the IRS might review his and others’ tax returns, and that 
they could be subject to audit.  But the Supreme Court was clear in 
Marinello III that routine administration of the tax code, which seems to 
encompass the reviewing of tax returns, was an insufficient IRS action to 
trigger the crime of obstruction.276  And even if an audit counts as a 
proceeding, it is far from foreseeable that the audit will happen, or that 
 
 273. Marinello v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 1101, 1110 (2018).  
 274. Id. 
 275. United States v. Willner, No. 07 Cr. 183, 2007 WL 2963711, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007). 
 276. Marinello, 138 S.Ct. at 1110.  
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there would be a nexus between that proceeding and the conduct.   
Under Marinello III, cases like Willner are unlikely to survive under  
§ 7212(a).  However, these cases are the exception, rather than the rule, 
so removing such cases from the corpus of § 7212(a) prosecutions will 
have little overall impact on who is prosecuted under the statute.  
B. In Most Cases in Which the Defendant Challenged His § 7212(a) 
Conviction, the Defendant’s Commission of Other Felony Offenses 
Mean that the Outcome Would Be the Same With § 7212(a) or 
Without It 
The other reason that not much will change in the wake of Marinello 
III is that when the Tax Division has authorized charging the omnibus 
provision in the absence of a pending IRS proceeding, it has generally 
required those cases to be “large scale” and affecting the tax liability of 
third parties.277  These situations will almost invariably encompass 
conduct that could easily be charged under other provisions of the Federal 
Criminal Code.  
Sometimes, the presence of other felony criminal counts makes the 
addition of § 7212(a) obstruction almost meaningless in terms of the 
overall outcome of the case.  For example, in Kassouf—in which the Sixth 
Circuit for the first time imposed the “pending IRS action” requirement—
the defendant was charged with twenty-five felony counts in addition to § 
7212(a).278  The government alleged that the defendant engaged in myriad 
partnership transactions that inured to his personal benefit, but failed to 
maintain the necessary records to calculate the tax liabilities for those 
transactions.279  Specifically, the indictment alleged that he failed to 
maintain partnership books and records, transferred funds between bank 
accounts to deceive the IRS, and filed false tax returns that did not report 
those transactions, thereby misleading the IRS about how much he owed 
in taxes.280  The government charged the defendant with § 7212(a) and 
with twenty-five other felony counts, including four counts of § 7201 (tax 
evasion) and twenty counts of § 7206(1) (failure to file). 
Thus, the outcome of the prosecution in Kassouf was likely not at all 
dependent on the viability of the § 7212(a) count.  The defendant’s 
conduct supported twenty-five other felony counts with higher maximum 
 
 277. Dep’t of Just., Crim. Tax Manual, 3.00 Tax Div. Pol’y Directives & Memoranda, 49 (2012), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tax/legacy/2014/08/05/CTM%20Chapter%203.pdf#Directive
%20No.%20129 (emphasis added). 
 278. United States v. Kassouf, 144 F.3d 952, 953 (6th Cir. 1998).  
 279. Id. at 953.   
 280. Id. In addition to charging the defendant with one count of § 7212(a), the government charged 
him with four counts of tax evasion under § 7201 and twenty-six counts of filing false tax returns under § 
7206(1).  Id.   
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sentences.281  In fact, the defendant’s sentence is unlikely to have changed 
much, if at all, if the § 7212(a) count remained viable.  Total cumulative 
tax loss, not the number of felony counts of conviction or the statutory 
maximum penalty of those felony counts, drives the sentencing guidelines 
calculation.  Similar to the Guidelines today, the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines in 1998 contained an Application Note to the applicable 
guidelines provision, U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, stating that all conduct 
contributing to the tax loss should be considered part of the same course 
of conduct for purposes of determining the tax loss.  Thus, whether the 
defendant pled guilty to one or more counts or was convicted at trial, the 
tax loss amount would have determined the starting point for his 
sentencing guidelines calculation.  In other words, the charge of 
obstruction was not necessary to achieve the same result.  
Another example of a case in which the § 7212(a) charge would not 
have impacted sentencing is United States v. Kelly, 564 F. Supp.2d 843, 
844 (N. D. Ill. 2008). In Kelly, the defendant was charged with twelve 
counts of tax-related crimes.282  The defendant operated a consulting 
business and a commercial roofing business, which he used to pay 
personal expenses, including purchasing a $700,000 home and other 
personal expenditures, including a $19,000 home theater, $70,000 in 
home electronics, $40,000 in landscaping, a $23,000 dining room table, 
drapes, jewelry, motorcycle repairs, hardwood floors, and other various 
incidentals.283  Rather than report his income as he was legally obligated 
to do, the defendant instead used his companies’ books to conceal those 
personal expenses and classified them instead as business expenses in 
order to conceal them from the IRS.284  This resulted in false tax returns 
under-reporting over $1.3 million in personal income.285 
The defendant was charged with one count of obstructing the IRS under 
§ 7212(a), nine counts of filing false tax returns (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)), 
one count of aiding and assisting in the preparation of a false tax return 
(26 U.S.C. § 7206(2)), and one count of structuring transactions to evade 
reporting requirements (18 U.S.C. § 5313(a) and § 5324(a)(3)).  The basis 
of the obstruction charge under Count One was that the defendant 
 
 281. The statutory maximum sentence for 7212(a) is three years, whereas the statutory maximum 
sentence for § 7201 and § 7206(1) is five years each.  See Attempt to Evade or Defeat Tax, 26 U.S.C. § 
7201 (1982); Fraud and False Statements, 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (1982); Attempts to Interfere with 
Administration of Internal Revenue Laws, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (1954). 
 282. Indictment, United States v. Kelly, No. 07-CR-837 (N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division), Docket 
Entry 1.  
 283. Plea Agreement, United States v. Kelly, No. 07-CR-837 (N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division), 
Docket Entry 35, at 4-6. 
 284. Id. at 6-9. 
 285. Id. at 9. 
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impeded the IRS’s ability to assess and collect his taxes, which included 
submitting false information to the IRS.286 
The defendant ultimately pled guilty to one count of § 7212(a) and one 
count of structuring.287  Sentencings for financial crimes are typically 
driven by the dollar value of the financial loss; in this case, the tax loss 
amount drove the calculation, and the structuring counts did not change 
the defendant’s sentencing guidelines calculation.288  In pleading guilty, 
the defendant agreed to the entire tax loss amount, the cumulative amount 
of tax loss for all the various tax counts.289  However, the total tax loss 
would have been used for sentencing if the defendant had pled guilty to 
just one count of § 7206(1) instead of § 7212(a).  United States Sentencing 
Guideline § 2T1.1, Application Note Two states, “In determining the total 
tax loss attributable to the offense (see §1B1.3(a)(2)), all conduct 
violating the tax laws should be considered as part of the same course of 
conduct or common scheme or plan unless the evidence demonstrates that 
the conduct is clearly unrelated.”290  Thus, there was nothing magical 
about using § 7212(a) as the count of conviction.  The obstruction count 
carried a maximum sentence of three years, while each count of § 7206(1) 
carried a maximum sentence of five years; perhaps this made § 7212(a) a 
better bargaining chip for purposes of plea negotiations.291  However, as 
the defendant’s guidelines calculation was 37 to 46 months, well below 
the statutory maximum of 60 months for one count of § 7206(1), the 
statutory maximum sentence was, for practical purposes, irrelevant.292 
Similarly, in United States v. Armstrong, 974 F.Supp. 528 (E.D. Va. 
1997), the defendant was charged with one count of obstructing the due 
administration of the Internal Revenue Laws under § 7212(a) and five 
counts of filing a false tax return, in violation of § 7206(1).293  In that case, 
the defendant, an NBA referee, had defrauded the IRS by failing to report 
income he received in the course of his employment by “down grading” 
first-class tickets and pocketing the difference in price.294  Just as in 
Kassouf and Kelly, the total tax loss, not the number of counts or the 
 
 286. United States v. Kelly, 564 F.Supp. 2d 843, 843-44 (N.D. Ill. 2008).  
 287. Plea Agreement, United States v. Kelly, No. 07-CR-837 (N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division), 
Docket Entry 35, at 2. 
 288. Id. at 16. 
 289. Id. at 9, 15. 
 290. U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, Application Note 2 (Sentencing Guidelines Effective November 2018). This 
Application Note is the same in the 2017 Guidelines.  
 291. Plea Agreement, United States v. Kelly, No. 07-CR-837 (N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division), 
Docket Entry 35, at 14. 
 292. Id. at 17. Note that the defendant also pled guilty to one count of structuring, which carries a 
five-year maximum sentence, which adds to the maximum sentence of whichever tax count the 
government decided to choose.   
 293. United States v. Armstrong, 974 F.Supp. 528, 531 (E.D.Va. 1997).  
 294. Id.  
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inclusion of § 7212(a), would have driven the sentencing calculation.  
While the addition of § 7212(a) to these cases likely would not have 
changed the outcome for the defendant or the government, there are, 
admittedly, a few intangible prosecutorial advantages to adding a  
§ 7212(a) count to an indictment that also alleges other tax crimes.  For 
one thing, a § 7212(a) count, which is a continuing offense, helps “tie 
together” the evidence of other tax crimes, which are typically related to 
a particular tax year (for example, each count of filing a false tax return 
or tax evasion is related to a specific tax year). In a trial on several tax 
counts, it can help the jury to see a theme in the defendant’s conduct, and 
to put in evidence of the defendant’s nefarious mens rea related to tax 
years not charged as evasion or false returns.  For another thing, 
prosecutors in tax cases are often concerned that evidence related to older 
tax crimes may constitute inadmissible 404(b) evidence.  Adding a 
continuing offense, such as § 7212(a), helps the prosecutor avoid the 
potential 404(b) problem, allowing her to admit into evidence all acts of 
malfeasance, even those that occurred outside the statute of limitations.  
However, evidence of obstructive conduct is generally admissible 
anyway—with or without a continuing offense—to prove the defendant’s 
willful intent. 
Aside from these concerns, adding an obstruction charge does not seem 
to have added much to prosecutions that included multiple other counts 
of filing false returns or other counts of tax evasion.  That is, the evidence 
needed to establish the obstruction, as charged, was essentially the same 
as the evidence needed to establish the false returns counts.  Moreover, 
the obstruction counts in these cases seem largely irrelevant to the overall 
outcomes.  
In other cases, charging decisions led to charging § 7212(a) in lieu of 
what might otherwise have been charged as tax evasion.  For example, in 
United States v. Sorensen, the defendant, an oral surgeon and tax 
protestor, hired a corrupt attorney to use trusts and nominee bank accounts 
to hide his income of at least $1.5 million from the IRS.295  The evidence 
clearly demonstrated that the defendant knew the trust scheme was illegal, 
or at least that he deliberately ignored one red flag after another, including 
the advice of counsel and the advice of an accountant.296  He even 
continued to use the scheme after he learned that a federal search warrant 
had been executed at the attorney’s law office.297  At the end of the 
scheme, the IRS notified the defendant that he was the target of a criminal 
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investigation.298  An IRS agent came to his office, and the defendant 
locked the door and refused to let her in.299  Instead of being compliant 
with the investigation, he sent the IRS agent a questionnaire asking her 
for personal information, including her home address, social security 
number, and birthday.300   
In Sorensen, the defendant himself argued that he should have been 
charged with tax evasion rather than obstructing the IRS.301  The 
defendant engaged in a series of proffers with the government, but rather 
than pleading guilty, he was tried and ultimately convicted of one count 
of § 7212(a).302  On appeal, he raised several arguments, among them that 
§ 7212(a) required that he was aware of a pending IRS action at the time 
he engaged in his corrupt conduct, and that his conduct was more 
appropriately charged under § 7201, another felony count with a five-year 
statutory maximum, rather than the three-year statutory maximum found 
in § 7212(a).303 
In analyzing the question whether the defendant in Sorensen should 
have been charged under § 7212(a) or § 7201, the court explained that 
Tax Division policy instructed that § 7212(a) “should not be used as a 
substitute for a charge directly related to tax liability—such as tax evasion 
or filing a false tax return—if such a charge is readily provable.”304  The 
court explained that it would not second-guess the government’s decision 
not to charge § 7201 because such charge was not “readily provable.”305  
The court later explained that DOJ’s failure to comply with its own policy 
does not confer any substantive rights on the defendant.306   
For cases such as this, DOJ could likely substitute § 7201, or some 
other criminal tax statute, and still obtain a conviction.  While it is, of 
course, possible that the government did not have sufficient evidence to 
convict the defendant in Sorensen of tax evasion under § 7201, tax 
evasion clearly seems to fit the conduct at issue in the case.  Admittedly, 
tax evasion under § 7201 is more difficult to prove than § 7212(a), in part 
because the government is required to prove that the IRS suffered a tax 
loss. Proving a tax loss can be cumbersome and time-consuming, both 
during the investigation and prosecution of the case and also at trial.  From 
the perspective of a trial attorney, it is much easier to keep the attention 
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of a jury by talking about obstructive conduct than by painstakingly going 
through the mechanics of a tax loss calculation.  However, § 7201 is a 
specific statute that encompasses conduct, like Sorensen’s, that is 
intended to evade the assessment or payment of taxes.  Thus, while § 
7212(a) might be an easier avenue to obtain a conviction, it is not the only 
way to do so. 
C. The New § 7212(a) Requirements Are Unlikely to Motivate the IRS 
to Initiate More Proceedings or Advertise Those Proceedings 
Sooner Than Previously 
In addition to having scant impact on charging decisions, the new  
§ 7212(a) requirements the Supreme Court articulated in Marinello III are 
unlikely to have a practical “upstream” impact on the IRS itself.  That is, 
the IRS is not likely to change its procedures for initiating proceedings 
because of Marinello III.  First, the IRS is not likely to open additional 
proceedings.  One could imagine a scenario where the IRS decided, to 
ensure that § 7212(a) was a viable option for every individual who might 
later engage in annoying or harassing behavior, to open an investigation 
on every taxpayer.  This would result in a “pending IRS action or 
proceeding” on every taxpayer, thus giving the government the foothold 
to charge § 7212(a) if the interactions began to sour.  This tactic would 
likely be entirely fruitless; Marinello III requires that the taxpayer is 
aware of the pending IRS proceeding and that his conduct have some 
“nexus” to the proceeding, which would keep the IRS from initiating 
meaningless proceedings to open the door to § 7212(a) prosecutions. 
Nor is the IRS any more likely than it already was to notify taxpayers 
that they are under investigation.  First, most taxpayers who end up being 
charged with § 7212(a) are well aware that they are under investigation 
by the IRS, or at the very least know that they are the subject of an IRS 
civil audit.  Many of these individuals are the notorious “tax protestors,” 
who loudly and repeatedly insist that the IRS has no right to collect their 
taxes or conduct investigations.  For these individuals, the IRS has already 
notified them that they are under investigation, and the defendant’s 
prerequisite knowledge to underlie § 7212(a) charges is already well in 
hand.   
Moreover, Marinello III likely does not mean the IRS is likely to 
disclose that an individual is under investigation if the IRS was not 
already inclined to do so.  In many cases, the IRS is already motivated to 
be transparent when it begins to criminally investigate someone because 
early disclosure encourages the suspect individual to come to the plea 
bargain table early, saving everyone time and resources (and resulting in 
a better deal for the individual).  However, there are certainly cases where 
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the IRS might delay publicizing an investigation out of fear that assets 
will be disposed of, evidence will be destroyed, or putative criminals will 
flee the reach of U.S. laws.  The new guidelines in Marinello III are 
unlikely to motivate the IRS to disclose the existence of an investigation 
in these cases.  These cases tend to be far more serious than one three-
year felony obstruction count, and it is unlikely that the IRS will risk 
losing assets, evidence, or persons in a serious case in order to notify an 
individual he is under investigation so that a § 7212(a) charge might later 
result. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Marinello III abrogated all 
but one circuit court and appears to have drastically altered the landscape 
for what charges under § 7212(a) require, the outcomes in most criminal 
tax cases are unlikely to change in the wake of that decision.  The 
development of the circuit split appears to have been heavily influenced 
by the fact that DOJ has traditionally limited § 7212(a) prosecutions to 
those where a defendant interferes with an audit or investigation, or when 
the defendant’s conduct was large in scale and affected the tax liability of 
third parties.  While judicial opinions appear to have expanded the 
conduct that can be prosecuted under § 7212(a), prosecutions have, in 
reality, remained relatively self-limited by DOJ.  Further, the Supreme 
Court’s holding that § 7212(a) requires the government to prove that, at 
the time he engaged in corrupt conduct, the defendant was aware of a 
pending or reasonably foreseeable IRS proceeding, and that his conduct 
bore a “nexus” to that proceeding, does not limit the statute much farther 
than DOJ already has.  The same evidence that the defendant obstructed 
a pending proceeding will typically also establish the “nexus” between 
the proceeding and the defendant’s actions.  Further, most defendants who 
were previously charged with § 7212(a) when there was not a pending 
IRS proceeding will be subject to the same penalties for violating other 
criminal tax laws.  Finally, Marinello III is unlikely to change the way the 
IRS initiates audits and investigations.  As a result, Marinello III is 
unlikely to drastically change the landscape of criminal tax prosecutions.  
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